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Long-Arm Jurisdiction in California 
Under New Section 410.10 of the 
Code of Civil Procedure 
By JOHN A. GORFINKEL * AND RICHARD A. LAVINE** 
I. Introduction 
A. Background 
Since 1878, when the United States Supreme Court rendered its 
classic decision in Pennoyer v. Neff/ it has been settled law that the 
due process clause of the fourteenth amendment imposes certain con-
stitutional limitations upon the courts of a state in their exercise of 
jurisdiction over persons absent from the state. The perennial prob-
lem has been to determine precisely what those limitations are-to 
distill specific guidelines from the unspecific "due process" concept. 
This problem posed no serious difficulties for Justice Field, who wrote 
the majority opinion in Pennoyer. "[T]here can be no doubt of [the] 
meaning [of the due process clause] when applied to judicial pro-
ceedings," he asserted; in personal actions, due process required that 
the defendant "must be brought within the state's jurisdiction by serv-
ice of process within the state, or his voluntary appearance."2 Thus 
* A.B., 1926, J.D., 1929, J.S.D., 1931, University of California, Berkeley; 
Member, California Bar. 
** A.B., 1939, University of California, Los Angeles; J.D., 1942, LL.M., 1955, 
University of Southern California; Member, California Bar. 
This article is the combined effort of both authors, who acknowledge their 
appreciation to the Editors of The Hastings Law lournal for their editorial efforts in 
integrating and supplementing the contributions of each. Because of the nature of 
the subject, it was impossible to present the authors' contributions in separate and 
distinct sections. 
Technical Note: Sections of the California Code of Civil Procedure that have 
been repealed by S.B. 503, effective July 1, 1970, have been cited both to the 
Code and to the most recent Statutes and Amendments to the Codes of California in 
which the text of the particular section appears. 
1. 95 U.S. 714 (1878). 
2. ld. at 733. Technically, the decision in Pennoyer v. Neff was not based on 
the fourteenth amendment since the challenged judgment had been rendered prior 
to the adoption of that amendment; however, the case was quickly regarded as establish-
ing a constitutional limitation on the jurisdiction of state courts. 
[1163] 
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the Court in Pennoyer drew a simple equation between due process 
limitations and traditional common law limitations on the acquisition 
of in personam jurisdiction: Only if the defendant is personally served 
with process while present in the forum state, or if-by general ap-
pearance in the action or by some other means-he voluntarily submits 
to the court's jurisdiction, does a state court obtain jurisdiction over an 
absent defendant's person. 
It is common knowledge, however, that history has not vindicated 
Justice Field's certitude concerning due process limitations on the 
state courts' in personam jurisdiction over absent individuals. In a 
well-known series of subsequent decisions, the Supreme Court gradu-
ally liberalized its restrictive Pennoyer doctrine and lengthened the 
list of constitutionally permissible "bases of jurisdiction." In addition 
to "presence" and "actual consent," other circumstances-such as the 
defendant's domicile within the state,3 a tort arising out of the de-
fendant's operation of a motor vehicle on the state's highways,4 or the 
doing of business by the defendant within the state5-were deemed 
sufficient to warrant a state court's exercise of personal jurisdiction 
over absent defendants. 
Finally, in International Shoe Co. v. Washington,6 the Court 
adopted a different technique for defining the constitutional boundaries 
of a state court's in personam jurisdiction. Rather than add to the list 
of specifically described situations held to constitute sufficient bases of 
extraterritorial jurisdiction, the Court announced a broad principle by 
which all concrete factual situations could be evaluated. State courts 
may exercise jurisdiction over nonresident defendants, it was held, 
whenever, under the facts of the particular case, the defendant has 
"certain minimum contacts with [the forum state] such that the main-
tenance of the suit does not offend 'traditional notions of fair play and 
substantial justice.' "7 
Like all general principles, the "minimum contacts" doctrine has 
the merit of flexibility and the defect of vagueness. In several subse-
quent decisions to be discussed in the following pages, however, the 
Supreme Court has attempted some refinement and clarification. 
Subject only to the limitations prescribed by the Federal Consti-
tution, a state legislature has the power to determine the extent to which 
3. Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457 (1940). 
4. Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352 (1927). 
5. Henry L. Doherty & Co. v. Goodman, 294 U.S. 623 (1935). 
6. 326 U.S. 310 (1945). 
7. Id. at 316. 
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courts of the state may exercise personal jurisdiction over absent de-
fendants. The common law recognized only two bases of jurisdiction 
-presence within the state and actual consent.8 The additional bases 
approved in this century by the Supreme Court may be utilized by 
state courts only to the extent that state statutes permit. 9 Hence, the 
states have enacted various types of long-arm statutes, all of which 
are designed to extend the in personam jurisdiction of state courts 
proportionately with the post-Penn oyer liberalization of federal due 
process requirements. 
The early long-arm statutes were necessarily of a very limited and 
specific character. Nonresident motorist statutes, for instance, em-
powered the courts to take jurisdiction over nonresident defendants 
sued on causes of action arising out of their operation of motor vehicles 
within the forum state.10 Other statutes conferred jurisdiction over 
absent "residents"ll or over absent nonresident individuals and foreign 
corporations sued on causes of action arising out of business they had 
done within the forum state.12 After International Shoe opened the 
door to a considerable expansion of the constitutional boundaries of 
state courts' long-arm jurisdiction, the state legislatures began enact-
ing long-arm statutes considerably more comprehensive in scope.13 
B. California's Long-Arm Statute: New Section 410.10 
The California legislature has enacted a long-arm statute that in 
terms makes the long-arm jurisdiction of California courts coextensive 
with constitutional boundary lines.14 New section 410.10 of the Code 
of Civil Procedure, which becomes effective July 1, 1970,15 succinctly 
states: "A court of this state may exercise jurisdiction on any basis not 
inconsistent with the Constitution of this state or of the United States." 
Thus California, after nearly 100 years of living with a patchwork quilt 
of jurisdictional provisions,16 some archaic and others self-limiting, 
8. Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1878). 
9. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 35, comment fat 184 
(Proposed Official Draft 1967) [hereinafter cited as SECOND REsTATEMENT OF CON-
FLICTS]. 
10. See Scott, Jurisdiction over Non-Resident Motorists, 32 MICH. L. REV. 325 
(1934). 
11. E.g., Cal. Stat. 1957, ch. 1674, § 1, at 3052, CAL. CODE Crv. PRoe. § 417 
(effective until July 1, 1970); see note 44 and accompanying text infra. 
12. E.g., UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-27-20 to -21 (1953). 
13. E.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110, § 17 (Smith-Hurd 1968). 
14. S.B. 503 (1969). 
15. Cal. Stat. 1969, ch. 1610, § 30. 
16. See Horowitz, Bases of Jurisdiction of California Courts to Render Judgments 
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has adopted the most comprehensive long-arm statute of any state. The 
advantages of couching the statute in such sweeping language are 
obvious. By stating the governing rule solely in terms of constitutional 
power, without enumerating specific circumstances under which its 
courts may take jurisdiction, California has avoided many problems 
of statutory construction that have plagued courts in other states.17 
Against Foreign Corporations and Non-Resident Individuals, 31 S. CAL. L. REV. 339 
(1958). 
For illustrations of the applicability of some of these statutes, see McGee v. 
International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957) (involving CAL. INS. CODE §§ 1610-
20); Henry R. Jahn & Son v. Superior Court, 49 Cal. 2d 855, 323 P.2d 437 (1958) 
(construing "doing business" under the provisions of Cal. Stat. 1968, ch. 132, §§ I, 2, 
at 343, 345, CAL. CODE Crv. PROC. § 411 (effective until July I, 1970) ); Turner v. 
Superior Court, 218 Cal. App. 2d 468, 32 Cal. Rptr. 717 (1963) (involving the "re-
strictive" provisions of Cal. Stat. 1957, ch. 1674, § 1, at 3052, CAL. CODE Crv. PROC. 
§ 417 (effective until July 1, 1970) ). 
There is an extensive amount of legal literature on the subject of long-arm 
jurisdiction; the following are the most comprehensive discussions of the subject: 
Currie, The Growth of the Long Arm: Eight Years of Extended Jurisdiction in 
Illinois, 1963 U. ILL. L.F. 533; Kurland, The Supreme Court, the Due Process Clause 
and the In Personam Jurisdiction of the State Courts, from Pennoyer to Denckla: A 
Review, 25 U. Du. L. REV. 569 (1958); von Mehren & Trautman, Jurisdiction to 
Adjudicate: A Suggested Analysis, 79 HARv. L. REV. 1121 (1966). 
17. The problems of statutory construction are illustrated by a comparison of the 
Illinois decision in Gray v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 22 Ill. 2d 
432, 176 N.E.2d 761 (1961), and the New York decision in Feathers v. McLucas, 15 
N.Y.2d 443, 209 N.E.2d 68, 261 N.Y.S.2d 8 (1965). Both states had statutes authoriz-
ing jurisdiction over a defendant who "commits a tortious act" within the state. In 
both cases injury resulted in the forum from an act or omission of the defendant in 
another state. The Illinois court held that the tort was committed in Illinois, stating: 
"It is well established, however, that in law the place of a wrong is where the last event 
takes place which is necessary to render the actor liable. . .. We think it is clear that 
the alleged negligence in manufacturing the valve cannot be separated from the reSUlting 
injury; and that for present purposes, like those of liability and limitations, the tort was 
committed in Illinois." 22 Ill. 2d at 435-36, 176 N.E.2d at 762-63. The New York 
court held that no tort was committed in New York, stating: "The tortious act charged 
against the appellant-that it improperly designed and assembled the tank-indis-
putably occurred in the out-of-state manufacturing process in Kansas. 
". . . The mere occurrence of the injury in this State certainly cannot serve to 
transmute an out-of-state tortious act into one committed here within the sense of the 
statutory wording." 15 N.Y.2d at 459-60, 209 N.E.2d at 77, 261 N.Y.S.2d at 20-21. 
Following this decision, New York amended its statute, section 302 of the Civil Practice 
Act, to cover such cases. N.Y. Crv. PRAC. LAW § 302 (McKinney 1969). 
It should also be noted, on the issue of statutory construction, that in the Gray 
case defendant suggested a distinction between "tort" and "tortious act," arguing that 
"instead of using the word 'tort,' the legislature employed the term 'tortious act,' 
and that the latter refers only to the act or conduct, separate and apart from any conse-
quences thereof." 22 Ill. 2d at 436, 176 N.E.2d at 763. The Illinois court did not agree 
with that argument, treating "tort" and "tortious act" as synonymous, at least for the 
purposes of the jurisdictional statute. Id. at 436-37, 176 N.E.2d at 763. 
May 1970] CALIFORNIA LONG-ARM JURISDICTION 1167 
There will be no need, under the new statute, for the two-step analysis 
of first determining whether the contemplated exercise of jurisdiction 
is within the legislative mandate, and then considering whether, if exer-
cised, it is within the constitutional limits permitted by the due process 
clause of the fourteenth amendment. Moreover, section 410.10 will 
not have any of the unduly limiting effects of a long-arm statute that 
identifies specific factual situations as bases of jurisdiction. Hence-
forth, California will not find itself in the position of other states whose 
statutes18 prevent their courts from taking advantage of the full sweep 
of the minimum contacts doctrine. 
Although section 410.10 will solve some old problems, it will 
create some new ones. In order to omit all statutory restrictions, it was 
necessary to omit also any language of definition or clarification.19 
Since the legislature has extended California's long-arm jurisdiction 
to the outermost limits of the due process clause, California courts will 
constantly be called upon to confront problems of constitutional mag-
nitude--problems that other states have avoided by inserting self-limit-
ing provisions in their long-arm statutes.20 
The principal problems under section 410.10 will arise in cases 
where jurisdiction is asserted over a defendant served with process out-
side California and is predicated on his status, his activities within the 
state, or his conduct outside the state causing an effect inside the state. 
This is a developing field in which the law is far from settled. Because 
the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment is involved, the 
United States Supreme Court is, of course, the final arbiter. Its deci-
sions since International Shoe in 1945, however, have been few,21 and 
the most recent of any significiance, Hanson v. Denckla,22 was handed 
down in 1958. Since that date, the determination of what due process 
requires in jurisdictional matters-the task of applying and refining the 
minimum contacts principle--has been left to the state courts and the 
Compare the similar problem in the application of the Federal Tort Claims Act. 
28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1964), which makes liability depend upon "the law of the place 
where the act or omission occurred." Richards v. United States, 369 U.S. 1 (1962); 
Eastern Air Lines, Inc. v. Union Trust Co., 221 F.2d 62 (D.C. Cir. 1955). 
18. ' E.g., Omo REv. CoDE ANN. § 2307.382 (Page'Supp. 1969); N.Y. CIv. PRAC. 
LAW § 302 (McKinney 1969). 
19. Compare the detail in the Wisconsin statute, WIS. STAT. ANN. § 262.05 
(Supp. 1969), and the Proposed Uniform Interstate and International Procedure Act, 
9B UNIFORM L. ANN. (1966), in 11 AM. J. CoMP. L. 415-36 (1962). 
20. This is especially true of New York; see Feathers v. McLucas, 15 N.Y.2d 443, 
209 N.E.2d 68, 261 N.Y.S.2d 8 (1965), discussed in note 17 supra. 
21. See notes 76-82 infra. 
22. 357 U.S. 255 (1958). 
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lower federal courts. From their decisions some suggested guidelines 
have emerged, but these are only tentative. For the time being, the 
only safe conclusion is that expressed by one commentator on the In-
ternational Shoe case: "[A]lthough old dogma has been destroyed, 
new doctrine to replace it has not been firmly fashioned."23 
In spite of this lack of any very definite guidance in the form of 
Supreme Court decisions, the California courts will not find themselves 
in a trackless wilderness when they begin construing and applying new 
section 410.10. In addition to the decisions from other states and from 
the lower federal courts, certain prior California decisions will prove 
helpful in some instances. Especially relevant is the line of cases, com-
mencing in 1958 with Henry R. Jahn & Son v. Superior Court,24 dealing 
with the permissible extent of jurisdiction over foreign corporations 
under old section 411 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which authorizes 
service of process on such corporations "doing business" in this state.25 
The Supreme Court of California held in the J ahn case that "whatever 
limitations [section 411] imposes are equivalent to those of the due 
process clause."26 Accordingly, with respect to foreign corporations, 
section 410.10 merely continues the law established by the Jahn case. 
Thus, judicial interpretations of the minimum contacts rule in cases 
arising under old section 411 should serve as guideposts in deciding 
questions that will arise under new section 410.10. Nevertheless, a 
word of caution is in order. The appellate court decisions under section 
411 have not been wholly consistent.27 Some judicial determinations 
that jurisdiction did not exist in particular cases under section 411 may 
well have been predicated on an interpretation of the minimum con-
tacts principle that was narrower than actually required by the due 
process clause. 28 
23. Kurland, The Supreme Court, The Due Process Clause and the In Personam 
Jurisdiction of State Courts, From Pennoyer to Denckla: A Review, 25 U. Cm. L. REV. 
569, 623 (1958). 
24. 49 Cal. 2d 855, 323 P.2d 438 (1958). 
25. Cal. Stat. 1968, ch. 132, §§ 1-2, at 343, CAL. CODE CIv. PROC. § 411 (effec-
tive until July 1, 1970). 
26. Id. at 858, 323 P.2d at 439. 
27. Compare A.R. Indus., Inc. v. Superior Court, 268 Cal. App. 2d 328, 335-36, 
73 Cal. Rptr. 920, 924-25 (1968), with Leach Co. v. Superior Court, 266 Cal. App. 2d 
493, 72 Cal. Rptr. 216 (1968), and Yeck Mfg. Corp. v. Superior Court, 202 Cal. App. 
2d 645, 21 Cal. Rptr. 51 (1962). See note 123 and text accompanying notes 147-51 
infra. 
28. E.g., Leach Co. v. Superior Court, 266 Cal. App. 2d 493, 72 Cal. Rptr. 216 
(1968); Gill v. Surgitool Inc., 256 Cal. App. 2d 583, 64 Cal. Rptr. 207 (1967); 
Yeck Mfg. Corp. v. Superior Court, 202 Cal. App. 2d 645, 21 Cal. Rptr. 51 (1962). 
The mechanical approach used in Gill and Yeck for determining the existence of long-
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Prior California cases holding that jurisdiction was not authorized 
under old section 417 of the Code of Civil Procedure29 will for the most 
part be irrelevant to cases arising under the new statute. Section 417 
limited long-arm jurisdiction over individuals to cases where the de-
fendant was a domiciliary at the time the cause of action arose, or the 
action was commenced or the process served.30 Section 410.10 repudi-
ates the self-imposed restrictions of section 417 and authorizes an en-
tirely new approach to the matter. 31 
In the hope of assisting in understanding the issues and furnishing 
some guide to an analysis, if not a solution, of the problems that will 
arise under section 410.10, this article, after a brief, selective review of 
the constitutional bases of jursidiction, will consider in some detail 
the potential reach of the new statute in the main areas of civil litigation. 
C. Matters Not Considered 
In order to keep the discussion within reasonable bounds, it should 
be made clear at the outset that certain matters fall outside the scope of 
the paper and will thus be either assumed or omitted. 
1. Only in personam jurisdiction will be considered, i.e., the 
power of a court, consistent with the due process clause, to render a 
judgment that is final and binding on all the parties and those in privity 
with them and that is further entitled to full faith and credit if sued on 
in another state for the purpose of there enforcing it against the original 
defendant. The extent to which a court may reach property in the 
state, belonging to an absent defendant, and subject that property to the 
plaintiff's claims, will not be considered.32 
2. The only jurisdiction issue that will be considered is whether 
the court has constitutional power to act; the subordinate issue of 
whether other considerations, such as forum non conveniens, mayor 
should cause the court to decline to act will not be discussed.33 
arm jurisdiction was expressly disapproved in Buckeye Boiler Co. v. Superior Court, 
71 A.C. 933, 943, 458 P.2d 57, 65, 80 Cal. Rptr. 113, 121 (1969). 
29. Cal. Stat. 1957, ch. 1674, § 1, at 3052, CAL. CODE CIV. FRoe. § 417 (effective 
until July 1, 1970). 
30. See note 44 and accompanying text infra. 
31. For a consideration of the background on section 417 and its role as limiting 
the jurisdiction of California courts, see 40 CALIF. L. REV. 156, 158 (1952); 23 CAL. 
ST. B.J. 196 (1948). See also Martens v. Winder, 341 F.2d 197 (9th Cir. 1965). 
32. For a discussion of the effect of the new California long-arm statute on in 
rem and quasi in rem jurisdiction, see Green, Jurisdictional Reform in California, 21 
HASTINGS L.J. - (1970). 
33. California has codified the doctrine of forum non conveniens. CAL. CODE 
1170 THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 21 
3. It is assumed in all cases that the court is competent in the 
sense of having subject matter jurisdiction both under the division of 
judicial power between federal and state courts and under the provisions 
of the California Constitution and statutes apportioning judicial business 
within the California court system. 
4. It is assumed that the statutory provisions for service of proc-
ess have been complied with and the defendant has received reason-
able notice and been given adequate opportunity to appear and de-
fend. 34 
5. It is assumed that there is no distinction between the jurisdic-
tional reach of a state court and of a federal court sitting in the state in 
a diversity case.35 Accordingly, cases from federal courts involving 
long-arm statutes will be considered as fully relevant to a discussion of 
state court power under like circumstances. 
II. Constitutional Bases of Jurisdiction 
In considering the matter of the constitutional bases of jurisdic-
tion, it is suggested that four general sources exist:36 (1) personal 
service of process on a defendant while he is physically present within 
the forum; (2) defendant's voluntary submission to the courts of the 
forum, either by his consent in advance or his "general appearance" in 
the action; (3) the existence of a status relationship, as a citizen, 
national or resident of, or person owing allegiance to, the forum; (4) 
some activity of the defendant in, or affecting persons or property in, 
the forum. 
CIV. PROC. § 410.30 (operative July 1, 1970). For a discussion of this new statute, see 
Note, Forum Non Conveniens in California, 21 HASTINGS L.J. - (1970). 
34. See Schroeder v. City of New York, 371 U.S. 208 (1962); Walker v. City 
of Hutchinson, 352 U.S. 112 (1956); Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 
339 U.S. 306 (1950). For analysis of the new California statutory provisions on 
service of process, see Note, Substituted Service of Process on Individuals: Code of 
Civil Procedure Section 415.20(b), 21 Hastings L.J. - (1970); Note, Service by Mail 
Provisions of California's New Jurisdiction Statute, 21 Hastings L.J. - (1970). 
35. See Martens v. Winder, 341 F.2d 197 (9th Cir. 1965) (considering the 
interaction of old Code of Civil Procedure section 417 and Federal Rule 4(e) ). 
36. See CALIFORNIA JUDICIAL COUNCIL, 1969 ANNUAL REPORT TO THE GOVERNOR 
AND THE LEGISLATURE, app. II [hereinafter cited as 1969 JUDICIAL COUNCIL REPORT], 
which lists 11 bases: "(1) Presence; (2) Domicil; (3) Residence; (4) Nationality or 
citizenship; (5) Consent; (6) Appearance in an action; (7) Doing business in the 
state; (8) An act done in the state; (9) Causing an effect in the state by an act 
done elsewhere; (10) Ownership, use or possession of a thing in the state; (11) Other 
relationships to the state which make the exercise of judicial jurisdiction reasonable." 
Id. at 71. These eleven are, in this article, regrouped by inclUding 2, 3 and 4 under 
the single heading of "status," 5 and 6 under the single heading of "consent" and the 
remainder, 7 through 11, under the single heading of "activity." 
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A. Physical Presence Within the Forum State 
As stated previously, questions concerning the sufficiency of the 
service of process upon a defendant are outside the scope of this dis-
cussion, even though such questions are properly termed "jurisdictional" 
in the sense that the court cannot render a valid judgment against a 
defendant whenever service was so defective as to deprive him of ade-
quate notice of the proceedings. But the physical act of delivering 
process personally to the defendant in the forum is not a source of the 
court's jurisdiction over him; and it is with the sources or bases of juris-
diction that this discussion is primarily concerned. 
The general proposition that service of process is not a "source" 
or "basis" of in personam jurisdiction is subject to one important and 
long-established exception: The personal service of process on a de-
fendant physically present in the state, no matter how transient or tem-
porary that presence may be, has consistently been held sufficient as a 
basis for the exercise of in personam jurisdiction. 37 This particular 
basis of jurisdiction is frequently-and justly-criticized.38 It rests on 
the untenable theory that "the foundation of jurisdiction is physical 
power."39 Moreover, it often operates inequitably: a nonresident de-
fendant served with process during a five minute sojourn in the forum 
state can be forced to return there to defend a suit having no relation-
ship whatever to that state. Notwithstanding these grave difficulties, 
"service upon a defendant while physically present" continues to be a 
constitutionally acceptable basis of jurisdiction. Hence it will pre-
sumably remain acceptable in California under section 410.10, although 
application of forum non conveniens may be sought to diminish the 
harshness of an otherwise valid service of process. 
B. Consent 
As noted previously, consent-actual or implied-is one of the 
37. When the defendant is truly a transient and the cause of action does not 
arise out of any act or activity in or affecting persons or property in the forum, ad-
judicatory power rests solely on the assertion of physical control over the person of the 
defendant. This is symbolized by the act of service, akin to the common law writ of 
capias ad respondendum. "A state has power to exercise judicial jurisdiction over an 
individual who is physically present within its territory, whether permanently or tem-
porarily, if at that time he is properly served with process." 1969 JUDICIAL COUNCIL 
REPORT at 71 (emphasis added). 
38. A. EHRENZWEIG, A TREATISE ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 103-07 (1962); 
EHRENZWEIG, The Transient Rule of Person Jurisdiction: The "Power" Myth and 
Forum Conveniens, 65 YALE L.J. 289 (1956); Schlesinger, Methods of Progress in 
Conflict of Laws-Some Comments on Ehrenzweig's Treatment oj "Transient' Jun's-
diction, 9 J. PUB. L. 313, 317-18 (1960). 
39. McDonald v. Mabee, 243 U.S. 90, 91 (1916). 
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traditional common law bases of jurisdiction. From Pennoyer to the 
present day it has been recognized as satisfying the requirements of the 
due process clause. A fortiori, "consent" will continue to be a sufficient 
basis of jurisdiction in California under section 410.10 
In the great majority of tort cases, the only consent likely to be 
involved is the consent implied by a defendant's general appearance in 
the action. In contract cases, on the other hand, consent will from time 
to time be invoked as a basis of jurisdiction under circumstances that 
may raise considerable doubt as to the fairness and propriety of sub-
jecting an absent defendant to the jurisdiction of a California court. 
The problem is best brought into focus by considering a concrete case. 
Assume that the parties to a contract have stipulated that disputes arising 
thereunder will be adjudicated by the appropriate California court. 
Pursuant to this stipulation, each party-assuming that both are non-
residents-appoints an agent in California to accept service of process 
in any action arising out of the contract. And assume in addition that 
there are no other contacts with the state of California-that neither 
party resides in California, and that the contract was made and was to 
be performed elsewhere. The United States Supreme Court's decision 
in National Equipment Rental, Ltd. v. Szukhent'° appears to authorize 
the California court's exercise of jurisdiction over the nonresident de-
fendant in such a case, provided that other due process requirements-
such as that the defendant receive reasonable notice of the proceedings 
-are fulfilled. The only difference between the facts of Szukhent and 
the facts of the preceding hypothetical is that the plaintiff in Szukhent 
was a resident of New York, the forum state. 
Cases of the Szukhent variety present two major difficulties. First 
of all, since the defendant has had no real contact with the forum state, 
the exercise of jurisdiction is seemingly questionable under the rule of 
International Shoe. Secondly, even if the defendant's "consent" is 
thought to obviate the need for any minimum contacts, the question 
often remains whether the defendant has really consented to the forum 
state's jurisdiction in any meaningful sense. This is because most con-
tractual provisions appointing agents to accept service-or waiving 
service-are contained in "adhesion" contracts between parties pos-
sessed of greatly disparate bargaining powerY The provision for ap-
pointment or waiver invariably works to the disadvantage of the weaker 
party, who in the typical case is either ignorant of the provision'S import 
40. 375 U.S. 311 (1964). 
41. It is apparent from one of the dissenting opinions in Szukhent that the con-
tract involved in that case was of the "adhesion" variety. [d. at 326. 
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or forced to accept it. Accordingly, in contract cases where the sole 
basis of jurisdiction is "consent" inferred from a clause in the contract 
by which a nonresident defendant either appointed an agent in Cali-
fornia or waived service in any action in California, it is suggested that 
the court should take the utmost care to ascertain whether the de-
fendant fully understood the import of such a provision when he exe-
cuted the contract. 42 A lack of full understanding on the defendant's 
part, together with the lack of any minimum contacts between the de-
fendant and the state of California, should be held to preclude the Cali-
fornia court's exercise of jurisdiction. 
C. Status-Domicile and Residence 
The defendant's status as a citizen, domiciliary, resident, or na-
tional of, or person owing allegiance to the forum, may furnish the basis 
for adjudicatory power over him.43 Old section 417 provided for in 
personam jurisdiction if the defendant was a "resident" of California at 
certain specified times; "resident" as used therein was interpreted as 
"domiciliary."44 Although neither the United States Supreme Court 
nor the Supreme Court of California has ever clearly ruled on the 
question, there is respectable authority that "residence," as distinguished 
from "domicile," may furnish a proper basis for the exercise of juris-
diction. 45 
Our concern at this point is to determine the conditions under 
which jurisdiction may be taken when the defendant's status is the sole 
basis for the assertion of jurisdiction. Throughout this subsection, 
42. "Heretofore, judicial good common sense has, on one ground or another, 
disregarded contractual provisions like this one, not encouraged them. It is a long trip 
from San Francisco-or from Honolulu or Anchorage-to New York, Boston, or 
Wilmington. And the trip can be very expensive, often costing more than it would 
simply to pay what is demanded. The very threat of such a suit can be used to 
force payment of alleged claims, even though they be wholly without merit. This fact 
will not be news to companies exerting their economic power to wangle such con-
tracts. No statute and no rule requires this Court to place its imprimatur upon them. 
I would not." ld. at 329 (Black, J., dissenting). 
43. See generally 1969 JUDICIAL COUNCIL REpORT, app. II, at 72-74. On the 
matter of allegiance, as distinct from nationality or citizenship, see the historic English 
case of Joyce v. Director of Public Prosecutions, [1946] A.C. 347. 
44. Allen v. Superior Court, 41 Cal. 2d 306, 259 P.2d 905 (1953), is frequently 
cited as the basis for this interpretation, but it appears that Smith v. Smith, 45 Cal. 2d 
235, 288 P.2d 497 (1955), citing some ambiguous language in Allen, is the real origin. 
See 45 Cal. 2d at 242, 288 P.2d at 500-01; Owens v. Superior Court, 52 Cal. 2d 822, 
827, 345 P.2d 921, 922 (1959); Soule v. Soule, 193 Cal. App. 2d 443, 445, 14 Cal. 
Rptr. 417, 418 (1961). 
45. SECOND REsTATEMENT OF CoNFLICTS § 30. 
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therefore, we must exclude from consideration any situations in which 
any element of the cause of action arises, or the defendant is served, 
within the state since, then, there is usually a sufficient basis of juris-
diction over the defendant regardless of his status. And, of course, 
we must assume that at some point during the period of time ex-
tending from immediately prior to the liability-creating tort or breach 
of contract until the moment of actual service of process, the defendant 
was linked to the forum by some tie of citizenship, domicile, residence 
or allegiance. 
The United States Supreme Court has long recognized that citizen-
ship is a proper basis for jurisdiction over an absent national when a 
federal claim is asserted in a federal tribunaJ:16 In 1940, in Milliken 
v. Meyer,47 the Court for the first time sustained a state court's asser-
tion of jurisdiction over an absent citizen of the forum. Following the 
Milliken decision, in order to restrict48 the jurisdiction of California 
courts over absent defendants, California adopted section 417 of the 
Code of Civil Procedure which, in substance, provided that personal 
jurisdiction could be assumed over an individual defendant only if he 
was personally served with process and was a "resident" of the state 
when the action was commenced or when process was served upon 
him.49 
Most, if not all, of the cases in which jursidiction was found to 
exist under section 417 involved activity of the defendant while he was 
physically present within the state. 50 In these cases, jurisdiction is con-
stitutionally supportable without regard to the residence or domicile of 
the defendant. 51 They cannot be used as authority to support a con-
46. Blackmer v. United States, 284 U.S. 421 (1932). 
47. 311 U.S. 457 (1940). 
48. See note 31 supra. 
49. Cal. Stat. 1951, ch. 935, § 1, at 2537. Section 417 was amended in 1957 
by adding that jUrisdiction could be assumed if defendant was a "resident" at the time 
the cause of action arose. Cal. Stat. 1957, ch. 1674, § 1, at 3052. 
50. In Allen v. Superior Court, 41 Cal. 2d 307, 259 P.2d 905 (1953), and 
Myrick v. Superior Court, 41 Cal. 2d 519, 261 P.2d 255 (1953), the actions were for 
injuries arising out of automobile collisions in California; this is stated in the report of 
the Allen case, 41 Cal. 2d at 308, 259 P.2d at 906, and in the opinion of the district 
court of appeal, subsequently vacated by the California Supreme Court's grant of hear-
ing, in the Myrick case in 256 P.2d at 349. In Owens v. Superior Court, 52 
Cal. 2d 822, 345 P.2d 921 (1959), the action was for injuries resulting from a dog 
bite. The tort was committed in California while the defendant, owner of the dog, 
was a resident of California. 
51. Under the decision in Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352 (1927), the California 
court could have taken jurisdiction in Myrick and Allen if the defendant motorists had 
been nonresidents; it would have been paradoxical if jurisdiction could not be obtained 
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stitutional basis for jurisdiction in a case in which the claim does not 
arise out of and is unrelated to the defendant's presence or activity in 
California. 52 
In determining the permissible scope of jurisdiction based on the 
defendant's status, two separate problems arise: exactly what status is 
required, and when must that status exist. For state purposes,53 the 
first problem arises out of the distinction between citizenship or domi-. 
cile54 and residence. 
All the authorities agree that, although factually domicile and resi-
dence are usually indistinguishable and a person's residence is normally 
also his domicile, legally they are separate and distinguishable con-
cepts.55 Domicile is the place where a person maintains his home. 56 
He may, by virtue of a temporary assignment, reside in one state while 
retaining his former domicile. 57 Or he may maintain two or more 
abodes in different states, residing in each for part of the year; and 
while each such abode is, for the time being, his residence, only one will 
be his domicile. 58 However, different courts may reach different con-
clusions as to which abode is, in fact, his domicile. 59 
Under the Milliken decision, status as a domiciliary-citizen at the 
merely because the defendant motorists were residents of the state. 
52. But see 1969 JUDICIAL CoUNCIL REPORT, app. n, at 73, citing Myrick v. 
Superior Court, 256 P.2d 348, 353 (Dist. Ct. App. 1953). Since the opinion in 
Myrick was vacated it cannot be cited as authority and the general statements in that 
portion of the Judicial Council Report must be taken with caution. See note 50 supra. 
53. A person may be a citizen or national of the United States without residing 
or being domiciled therein. See, e.g., Blackmer v. United States, 284 U.S. 421 (1932); 
Cook v. Tait, 265 U.S. 47 (1924). A person may owe allegiance to a national 
state without being a citizen, see 8 U.S.C. § 1408 (1964), or national, see Joyce v. 
Director of Public Prosecutions, [1946] A.C. 347, of that state. Since these distinctions 
do not apply to the states, they are not considered here. 
54. A citizen of the United States is a citizen of the state wherein he is domi-
ciled; except in the case of the domiciled alien, there is no distinction between state 
citizenship and state domicile. See SECOND RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICTS § 31, Re-
porters Notes. 
55. See gellerally 1969 JUDICIAL COUNCIL REpORT, app. n, at 72-73; SECOND 
RESTATEMENT OF CoNFLICTS § 11, comment k at 58-59. 
56. "To acquire a domicil of choice in a place, a person must intend, for the time 
at least, to make that place his home." SECOND RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICTS § 18. 
57. See District of Columbia v. Murphy, 314 U.S. 441 (1941). 
58. Texas v. Florida, 306 U.S. 398 (1939). The classic illustration is the case 
of Dr. John T. Dorrance. See In re Estate of Dorrance, 115 N.J. Eq. 268, 170 A. 601 
(Prerogative Ct. 1934), a/fd, 13 N.J. Misc. 168, 176 A. 902 (Sup. Ct. 1935), a/fd, 
116 N.J.L. 362, 184 A. 743 (Ct. Err. & App. 1936), cert. denied, 298 U.S. 678 (1937); 
III re Dorrance's Estate, 309 Pa. 151, 163 A. 303, cert. denied, 288 U.S. 617 (1932). 
59. Compare In re Estate of Dorrance, 115 N.J. Eq. 268, 170 A. 601 (Preroga-
tive Ct. 1934), with III re Dorrance's Estate, 309 Pa. 151, 163 A. 303 (1932). 
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moment of service is clearly sufficient to support jurisdiction.60 The 
question is whether status as "resident" will equally support jurisdiction. 
Whether residence will be sufficient status to support jurisdiction 
may well depend upon what is meant by "residence." If it means a 
fixed or settled place of abode for a substantial period of time, as 
distinguished from the transient presence of a traveller passing through 
and only temporarily sojourning, it would seem that such residence 
should be a constitutionally permissible basis for jurisdiction.61 Justi-
fication would lie in the fact that the benefits afforded by the state to 
such a "resident" are sufficiently substantial and long standing to 
justify a state in demanding the reciprocal obligation of responding to 
its judicial process. If the residence is merely temporary or transient, 
however, it should not suffice unless process is actually served on the 
defendant personally while he is within the state. If service is effected 
only after the defendant has departed from the state, his temporary 
residence at some past time seems too tenuous to support a claim of 
jurisdiction. 
Section 417, as amended, made "res:dence" a basis for jurisdiction 
at anyone of three points in time: when the cause of action arose, 
when the action was commenced, or when process was served.62 Since 
most of the cases involved causes of action arising in California and de-
fendants who were residents when the cause of action arose, little 
critical attention was paid to whether residence at the time the action 
was commenced or at the time process was served would properly 
support jurisdiction. 
(1) Status at the Time the Cause of Action Arose 
The defendant's status at the time the cause of action arose, with-
out any other contact with the forum, would appear to be a doubtful 
basis for jurisdiction. Although old section 417 authorizes jurisdiction 
60. Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457 (1940). "Domicile in the state is alone 
sufficient to bring an absent defendant within the reach of the state's jurisdiction for 
purposes of a personal judgment by means of appropriate substituted service." Id. 
at 462. 
61. This is the view adopted by the Judicial Council Report. 1969 JUDICIAL 
COUNCIL REPORT, app. II, at 73. This position is not, however, supported by any 
California case. The reference in the Judicial Council Report to Myrick v. Superior 
Court is to an opinion in the district court of appeal which was vacated by grant of 
hearing by the California Supreme Court and therefore not good authority. See note 
50 supra. The California Supreme Court has consistently held that "resident" as used 
in section 417, means "domicilliary." See, e.g., cases cited note 44 supra. 
62. See note 49 and accompanying text supra. 
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where the defendant was a resident when the cause of action arose, 
no California case has been found in which such a residence or 
domicile at that time was the sole basis for jurisdiction. 63 Indeed, a 
dictum in Owens v. Superior Court64 suggests that it may not be a 
sufficient basis for jurisdiction. 
In contract actions it is possible to argue that defendant's rela-
tionship to a particular state at the time the contract was made or 
performance thereunder was due gives that state the requisite interest 
and that therefore maintenance of the suit there will not offend "tradi-
tional notions of fair play."65 
In tort actions, it seems less likely that such jurisdiction is justi-
fiable where the cause of action arose outside the state and the defend-
ant's conduct in no way impinged upon or affected persons or property 
within the forum. 66 To pose an extreme case, assume that the defend-
ant, a domiciliary of California while en route to a new home in New 
York, injures plaintiff in Colorado. Since, at the time of injury, de-
fendant had not reached his destination, his domicile was still in Cali-
fornia. 67 But if, prior to the commencement of the action, he had 
reached New York and there established a new domicile, there would be 
no relationship linking him to California at the time the action was com-
63. "It has been held that a state under certain circumstances has jurisdiction 
over a defendant who is domiciled in the state at the time when the cause of action 
arose . . •. " 1969 JUDICIAL COUNCIL REPORT, app. II, at 72, citing Owens v. Superior 
Court, 52 Cal. 2d 822, 829, 345 P.2d 921, 923 (1959). The Owens decision does 
not support the statement. The defendant committed the tort in California; also, the 
court expressly questioned past domicile as a basis for jurisdiction, unless the cause of 
action was related to that domicile: "We agree with defendant, however, that the mere 
fact of past domicile in the state would not subject him to its jurisdiction indefinitely, 
for a past domicile having no relationship to the litigation at hand would not afford a 
reasonable basis for an assertion of jurisdiction. 
". . • [l]t may be debatable whether [jurisdiction based on residence at the time 
the cause of action aroseJ can constitutionally be assumed in the absence of some other 
relevant contacts with the state. If, for example, neither the plaintiff nor the defendant 
were presently domiciled here and the cause of action arose out of the defendant's ac- . 
tivities elsewhere, the fact standing alone that the defendant was domiciled here at the 
time the cause of action arose might be too tenuous a basis for asserting jurisdiction 
over him." 52 Cal. 2d at 829, 345 P.2d at 923-24 (emphasis added). 
64. 52 Cal. 2d 822, 345 P.2d 921 (1959); see note 63 supra. 
65. See text accompanying notes 200-214 infra. 
66. See Skiriotes v. Florida, 313 U.S. 69 (1941), recognizing that there may be 
circumstances under which a state has sufficient interest or concern to punish one of 
its citizens for an act committed outside the state's territorial limits and not directly 
injuring a person or property within the state. 
67. Alvord & Alvord v. Patenotre, 196 Misc. 524, 92 N.Y.S.2d 514 (Sup. Ct. 
1949); SECOND RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICTS § 19, comment a at 99. "A domicile once 
established continues until it is superseded by a new domicile." ld. § 19. 
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menced and no reason why California should or should be permitted to, 
assume jurisdiction. 68 
(2) Status at the Time the Action Was Commenced 
The defendant's status at the time the action was commenced 
should be a sound basis for the exercise of jurisdiction, both practically 
and theoretically. Practically, the traditional view has been that the 
plaintiff had to seek out the defendant and sue him on his own home 
ground. If the plaintiff does so and files suit in defendant's forum, de-
fendant should not be permitted to render that act a nullity by shifting 
his base before he can be served with process.69 Theoretically, the filing 
of the action is the invocation of the state's adjudicatory power; if, at 
that time, an appropriate relationship exists, the state's jurisdiction over 
the defendant should immediately attach, subject only to the require-
ment that he be given reasonable notice and an opportunity to be heard. 
(3) Status at the Time Process Was Served 
All the considerations that support jurisdiction if the requisite 
status existed at the time the action was commenced, apply with equal 
force if the status exists at the time process is served. 
D. Activity 
The greatest changes wrought by section 410.10, as well as the 
principal problems in its application, will become apparent in cases 
where the defendant at all relevant times was a nonresident, nondomi-
ciliary of California, was served with process outside California, and 
has not appeared or otherwise voluntarily submitted to jurisdiction. It 
has long been recognized that a foreign corporation might subject itself 
to the jurisdiction of a state other than the state of its incorporation or 
principal place of business by engaging in activity therein. 70 As formu-
lated after the tum of the century, this doctrine required that the ac-
68. See Owens v. Superior Court, 52 Cal. 2d 822, 829, 345 P.2d 921, 923-24, 
(1959); see note 63 supra. 
69. "Defendant contends that since amenability to suit is a responsibility 
growing out of domicile in the state, it ceases when such domicile ceases. In the 
Allen case we held, however, that it did not cease if the action was commenced before 
the defendant changed his domicile to another state. . " Such jurisdiction is justi-
fied by the plaintiff's interest in being able to conduct his litigation on the basis of the 
facts existing at the time he must act. He must file his action where jurisdiction over 
the defendant may be obtained." Owens v. Superior Court, 52 Cal. 2d 822, 829, 345 
P.2d 921, 923 (1959). 
70. See, e.g., International Harvester Co. v. Kentucky, 234 U.S. 579 (1914). 
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tivity be regular, continuous and substantial so that the corporation 
could be regarded as "present" and "doing business" in the forum. 71 
The first recognition that certain types of activity might be suffi-
cient to confer jurisdiction over individuals was in the case of Hess v. 
Pawloski, decided in 1927.72 That decision sustained a state statute 
authorizing jurisdiction over a nonresident motorist served with process 
outside the forum, when the cause of action arose out of the motorist's 
use of the highway in the forum. The rationale first advanced for the 
doctrine was the fiction that the motorist, by using the highway, had 
either expressly or impliedly consented to such jurisdiction.73 Eventu-
ally it was recognized that this purported rationale was a fiction74 and 
the doctrine was placed on the sounder basis that a state had the power 
to hold a person amenable to the jurisdiction of its courts in an action 
arising out of his tortious conduct in the forum. 76 
In 1945, the United States Supreme Court decided International 
Shoe Co. v. Washington76 and thereby laid the foundation for the 
current development of long-arm statutes, predicating jurisdiction on 
the defendant's activities or minimum "contacts" with the forum. The 
claim in International Shoe was by the State of Washington to recover 
contributions to the state unemployment compensation fund. It was 
conceded that the activities of the corporation in the state were not 
sufficient to constitute "presence" or "doing business" in the traditional 
sense. Nevertheless, the Court sustained the power of the Washington 
courts on the theory that the claim arose out of activities of Interna-
tional Shoe's salesmen in the state and that this was sufficient to confer 
jurisdiction for the purposes of the particular suit. The essence of the 
holding and the reasons therefor are summed up in the following ex-
tract from the opinion: 
71. For the problems raised by attempts to define these terms, see Hutchinson 
v. Chase & Gilbert, 45 F.2d 139 (2d Cir. 1930) (L. Hand, J.). 
72. 274 U.S. 352 (1927). 
73. 1d. at 356. 
74. Olberding v. llIinois Cent. R.R., 346 U.S. 338 (1953). "It is true that in 
order to ease the process by which new decisions are fitted into pre-existing modes of 
analysis there has been some fictive talk to the effect that the reason why a non-
resident can be subjected to a state's jurisdiction is that the non-resident has 'impliedly' 
consented to be sued there. In point of fact, however, jurisdiction in these cases does 
not rest on consent at all. See [Scott, lurisdiction over Non-resident Motorists, 39 
IIARv. L. REv. 563 (1926)]. The defendant may protest to high heaven his unwilling-
ness to be sued and it avails him not. The liability rests on the inroad which the au-
tomobile has made on the decision of [Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1878)] as 
it has on so many aspects of our social scene." 346 U.S. at 340-41. 
75. ~ee A. EHRENZWEIG, A TREATISE ON THE CON,FLICT OF LAws 96-98 (1962). 
76. .~6 U.S. 310 (1945). 
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Historically the jurisdiction of courts to render judgment in per-
sonam is grounded on their de facto power over the defendant's 
person. Hence his presence within the territorial jurisdiction of a 
court was prerequisite to its rendition of a judgment personally 
binding him. But now that the capias ad respondendum has given 
way to personal service of summons or other form of notice, due 
process requires only that in order to subject a defendant to a judg-
ment in personam, if he be not present within the territory of the 
forum, he have certain minimum contacts with it such that the 
maintenance of the suit does not offend "traditional notions of fair 
play and substantial justice."77 
Later in the opinion, the Court stated that the demands of due process 
"may be met by such contacts of the corporation with the state of the 
forum as make it reasonable, in the context of our federal system of 
government, to require the corporation to defend the particular suit 
which is brought there.78 
Since the International Shoe decision, the United States Supreme 
Court has rendered four decisions which shed some light on the scope 
and implications of the minimum contacts doctrine, Travelers Health 
Ass'n v. Virginia79 in 1950, Perkins v. Benguet Consolidated Mining 
Co.so in 1952, McGee v. International Life Insurance CO.81 in 1957 
and Hanson v. Denckla82 in 1958. From these decisions three proposi-
tions emerge as clearly settled and relevant in the application of the 
activity concept. The first of these propositions is that although the 
International Shoe case was concerned with and spoke of corporations, it 
is not limited to corporations. The minimum contacts doctrine applies 
to individuals and partnerships as well as corporations; no subsequent 
case has doubted this extension. S3 The second proposition is that when 
the minimum contacts doctrine is invoked as the sole basis for juris-
diction the claim sued on must arise out of those contacts of the defend-
ant with the forum that are asserted as furnishing the jurisdictional 
basis.s4 The third proposition is that the minimum contacts doctrine 
has supplemented, not superseded, the earlier concepts of "presence" 
and "doing business' and the latter still possesses vitality, with the signifi-
cant difference stated thus: If "presence" or "doing business" is the 
77. ld. at 316 (citations omitted). 
78. ld.at317. 
79. 339 U.S. 643 (1950). 
80. 342 U.S. 437 (1952). 
81. 355 U.S. 220 (1957). 
82. 357 U.S. 235 (1958). 
83. See SECOND RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICTS § 845. 
84. See text accompanying notes 77-78 supra. See also Fisher Governor Co. v. 
Superior Court, 53 Cal. 2d 222, 347 P.2d 1, 1 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1959). 
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basis for jurisdiction, the claim sued on does not have to arise out of 
activities in the forum state but may, in fact, be wholly unrelated to 
those activities.85 
Unfortunately, these areas of certainty are only a small part of 
the entire picture; large areas of uncertainty still exist in determining 
what activities constitute minimum contacts. International Shoe did 
no more than state a principle in general and vague language, and 
while it pointed out the direction in which the law should develop, it 
did not define the boundaries of that development. None of the subse-
quent Supreme Court decisions has been particularly helpful in furnish-
ing guides; and in the main, the role of interpreting and exploring the 
minimum contacts doctrine has been left to the state courts. 
Interpreting and exploring the vague contours of the minimum 
contacts doctrine will be the essential task of the California courts when 
they are called upon to apply section 410.10. Whatever uncertainties 
inhere in the minimum contacts concept inhere also in the new Cali-
fornia statute. In order to minimize at least some of the uncertainty, 
and to predict in concrete terms the impact of section 410.10, the re-
maining portion of this essay is devoted to a discussion of specific 
factual situations likely to arise in the two main categories of civil liti-
gation-torts and contracts. The central unifying purpose of the entire 
discussion is to provide answers to a single question that will recur 
in many different kinds of cases: What factual situations satisfy the 
minimum contacts requirement, and thus enable California courts to 
exercise long-arm jurisdiction under section 410.10? 
ID. Torts and Minimum. Contacts 
The scope of the minimum contacts doctrine-and hence the 
scope of section 410.10-m tort actions against absent defendants 
will be explored by treating separately the cases involving three distinct 
groups of torts. The first of the ensuing subsections concerns inten-
tional tort and negligence cases in which both the defendant's tortious 
85. See Perkins v. Benguet Consolo Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437 (1952); Brunzell 
Constr. Co. V. Harrah's Club, 225 Cal. App. 2d 734, 37 Cal. Rptr. 659 (1964). 
"[U]nless the defendant's forum-related activity reaches such extensive or wide-ranging 
proportions as to make the defendant sufficiently 'present' in the forum state to sup-
port jurisdiction over it concerning causes of action which are unrelated to that ac-
tivity (Fisher Governor CO. V. Superior Court . . . 53 Cal. 2d 222, 225, 1 Cal. Rptr. 
1, 347 P.2d 1, and authorities cited therein), the particular cause of action must arise 
out of or be connected with the defendants forum related activity." Buckeye Boiler 
CO. V. Superior Court, 71 A.C. 933, 938-39, 458 P.2d 57, 62, 80 Cal. Rptr. 113, 118 
(1969). 
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conduct and the plaintiffs resulting injury occur in the forum state. 
Next come the cases-primarily products liability cases-in which the 
plaintiff is injured in the forum state by the defendant's conduct out-
side the state. The final subsection deals with other types of torts and 
calls particular attention to some special problems presented by ac-
tions for defamation and invasion of privacy. 
A. Conduct and Harm in the Forum-Intentional Torts and Negligence 
All the decisions seem to support the conclusion that a constitu-
tional basis for jurisdiction exists when the defendant, personally, 
or by agent, commits an act in the forum giving rise to a tort claim, 
even though that act occurs during a single, isolated entry into the 
state.86 
The historic situation is that of the nonresident motorist, and now 
that it is clearly recognized that the basis for jurisdiction transcends the 
the original "consent" fiction, the nonresident motorist decisions sup-
port the proposition stated above.87 In addition to the nonresident 
motorist cases, there are several instances in which isolated activity in 
the forum has been held sufficient to support jurisdiction. The most 
significant case is McGee v. International Life Insurance CO.,88 in 
which the United States Supreme Court sustained the jurisdiction of the 
California courts in an action on an insurance policy. The entire 
transaction had been handled by mail and, so far as appeared, was the 
only activity of the defendant company in California or with a Cali-
fornia resident. The opinion succinctly states: "It is sufficient for pur-
poses of due process that the suit was based on a contract which had 
substantial connection with the State [citing, among other cases, Hess 
v. PawloskfJ.89 
86. "In cases under these statutes in state and federal courts, jurisdiction on the 
basis of a single tort has been uniformly upheld: 'Indeed, the constitutionality of this 
assertion of jurisdiction, today, could only be doubted by those determined to oppose the 
clear trend of the decisions. This situation is exactly that of the nonresident-motorist 
statutes, which were long ago upheld, except that the highways are not directly in-
volved.''' Opinion of Mr. Justice Goldberg, in chambers, denying stay pending appeal 
in Rosenblatt v. American Cyanamid Co., 86 S. Ct. 1, 3-4 (1965) quoting Currie, The 
Growth of the Long Arm: Eight Years of Extended Jurisdiction in IIlinois, 1963 U. 
ILL. L.F. 515, 540. See also A.R. Indus., Inc. v. Superior Court, 268 Cal. App. 2d 328, 
73 Cal. Rptr. 920 (1968). "The making of a single contract or the commission of a 
single tort, within a jurisdiction may be a contact sufficient .... " ld. at 333, 73 Cal. 
Rptr. at 923, quoting Annot., 2 Law. Ed. 2d 1664, 1666 (1958). Cf. Bay Aviation 
Serv. Co. v. District Court, 149 Colo. 547, 370 P.2d 752 (1962) (denying jUrisdiction). 
87. See notes 72-75 & accompanying text supra. 
88. 355 U.S. 220 (1957). 
89. ld. at 223; see text accompanying note 72 supra. 
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One of the leading decisions on this· subject is by the lllinois Su'" 
preme Court in Nelson v. Miller.90 The defendant was a Wisconsin 
corporation; injury resulted from the alleged negligence of its employees 
in the course of delivering a stove in lllinois. From the report of the 
case, it appears that this might have been the only instance of defend-
ant's conduct or activity in the forum. In concluding that jurisdiction 
existed, the court stated: "The rational basis of the decisions upholding 
the nonresident motorist statutes is broad enough to include the case 
in which the nonresident defendant causes injury without the interven-
tion of any particular instrumentality."91 
In California, the same result was reached under old Code of Civil 
Procedure section 41192 in the case of James R. Twiss, Ltd. v. Superior 
Court.93 A vessel owned by Twiss, while on an international voyage, 
put into port for fuel, where the claimant was injured as a result of an 
alleged defect in the vessel. Although this particular entry for fuel 
was the only contact of defendant Twiss with California, jurisdiction 
was sustained. 
Similar cases involving assault, battery, and trespass to land or 
chattels or conversion of chattels located in the forum would seem to 
pose no problem. In all such cases, the defendant individually, or by 
authorized agent, must physically enter the forum and there com-
mit the act which gives rise to the cause of action. Such cases are 
indistinguishable from the nonresident motorist cases, once the con-
sent rationale is abandoned.94 It is also clear that a state may assert 
jurisdiction over an absentee owner or occupier of real property when the 
cause of action is for injuries resulting from the condition of the 
premises.9 1> Even before the International Shoe decision, states had 
applied the rationale of Hess v. Pawloski to this situation.96 
90. 11 m. 2d 378,143 N.E.2d 673 (1957). 
91. ld. at 389, 143 N.E.2d at 679. 
92. Cal. Stat. 1968, ch. 132, §§ 1-2, at 343, CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 411 (effec-
tive until July 1, 1970). 
93. 215 Cal. App. 2d 247, 30 Cal. Rptr. 98 (1963). 
94. See notes 72-75 & accompanying text supra. 
95. See SECOND REsTATEMENT OF CONFLICTS § 38; ct. Long v. Mishicot Modem 
Dairy, Inc., 252 Cal. App. 2d 425, 60 Cal. Rptr. 432 (1967); Long involved an action 
for breach of contract by defendant to sell 13 acres of land in California. Ownership of 
this land was defendant's sole contact with or activity in California. Jurisdiction was 
upheld, the court stating: "[A]lthough mere ownership of land may not be sufficient 
to subject a nonresident to personal jurisdiction in an unrelated cause of action, it 
may be sufficient, if the cause of action is related to such ownership." ld. at 428, 60 
Cal. Rptr. at ~5. 
96. Dubin v. City of Philadelphia, 34 Pa. D. & C. 61 (Phila. County Ct. 1938). 
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B. Conduct or Activity Outside the Forum Resulting in 
Harm Within the Forum 
[Vol. 21 
There are numerous situations in which the defendant, acting out-
side the forum, may cause harm to a plaintiff in the forum. Within 
this general category, there are a number of variations. The defendant 
may act with full knowledge of the plaintiff and his locale and with the 
intent to affect the plaintiff by his action.o7 The defendant may act 
without knowledge of any particular plaintiff or any particular locale, 
but with the intent of marketing his product in the forum or affecting 
people in the forum by his activities, wherever carried on.os Or, the 
defendant may act without knowledge of any particular plaintiff or any 
particular locale, but in such a manner that it is at least probable that 
his activities will affect people in the forum.oo Finally, the defendant 
may act with the intent and purpose of confining his product or his 
activities to his own locale so that an effect outside his home state will 
be fortuitous and unforeseeable.10o 
Each of these situations has arisen. Most of the cases have been 
in the field of products liability and the discussion that follows is pri-
marily devoted to that subject. However, the problems that arise and 
the solutions suggested are not so limited but can extend to any tort 
liability not requiring direct physical confrontation between plaintiff 
and defendant. 
C. Products Liability 
(1) Background 
The practical benefits accruing from the enlargement of a state's 
long-arm jurisdiction are perhaps nowhere better illustrated than in the 
products liability cases. Recognizing that large business concerns are 
best able to absorb and distribute the losses covered by an inevitable 
97. This is particularly true of the defamation cases. See text accompanying 
notes 168-88 infra. Note also Rosenblatt v. American Cyanamid Co., 86 S. Ct. 1 
(1965), where the major part of the conspiracy was outside the United States but the 
primary defendant did make one trip to New York in connection with that conspiracy; 
the question arises whether jurisdiction could have been supported if he had not made 
that entry into New York. 
98. See, e.g., Cosper v. Smith & Wesson Arms Co., 53 Cal. 2d 77, 346 P.2d 409 
(1959); Waco-Porter Corp. v. Superior Court, 211 Cal. App. 2d 559, 27 Cal. Rptr. 371 
(1963). 
99. E.g., Gray v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 22 Ill. 2d 432, 
176 N.E.2d 761 (1961); Feathers v. McLucas, 15 N.Y.2d 443, 458, 209 N.E.2d 68, 
76,261 N.Y.S.2d 8, 19 (1965). 
100. Cf. Leach Co. v. Superior Court, 266 Cal. App. 2d 493, 72 Cal. Rptr. 216 
(1968). 
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quantum of defects in today's enormous total output of manufactured 
goods, the California Supreme Court has imposed strict liability in tort 
upon manufacturers and sellers for injuries caused by defective prod-
uctS.10l But this vital principle, with all the enhanced protection it 
affords to consumers in an industrial society, would remain a dead letter 
in practice unless complemented by procedural statutes enabling an 
injured plaintiff to bring suit in his home state and thereby escape the 
prohibitive expense of travelling across the country to maintain an ac-
tion against an out-of-state manufacturer. In cases where the defend-
ant is a foreign corporation, the law under old section 411 has de-
veloped to the extent of permitting a plaintiff injured by a defective 
product in California to sue in California whenever the defendant know-
ingly reaped economic benefits from the sale of the product there.102 
Section 411, however, applies only to corporations; the more restrictive 
provisions of section 417 govern jurisdiction over individuals. New 
section 410.10 continues the principles enunciated under section 411, 
but those principles will now apply with equal force to all defendants, 
individual as well as corporate. 
Two jurisdictions normally claim principal interest in cases where 
damage results from the use or consumption of a defective product, 
whether the cause of action sounds in negligence, strict liability, or 
breach of warranty. One jurisdiction is the state where the defendant, 
by act or omission, breaches his duty of care or produces the defec-
tive product and puts it in the stream of commerce. The other juris-
diction is the state where the product is purchased and its use or con-
sumption results in harm to plaintiff. A complication arises and a 
third jurisdiction must be considered when the product is purchased in 
one state and its use results in harm in another state. loa 
Where the state statute is couched in terms of jurisdiction over a 
defendant who "commits a tort within the state," a serious problem of 
statutory construction arises in determining whether the tort was com-
mitted in the state where the defendant acted or in the state where the 
results of the defendant's conduct were felt. lo4 California, by the 
broad language of section 410.10, has avoided this preliminary prob-
lem, leaving for its own courts initially, and for the United States Su-
101. E.g., Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 
27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1963). 
102. Buckeye Boiler Co. v. Superior Court, 71 A.C. 933, 458 P.2d 57, 80 Cal. 
Rptr. 113 (1969). 
103. See Singer v. Walker, 15 N.Y.2d 443, 464, 209 N.E.2d 68, 80, 261 N.Y.S.2d 
8, 24 (1965). 
104. See note 17 supra. 
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preme Court eventually, to determine the scope of the forum's juris-
diction in these cases. 
In practice there is no problem of jurisdiction in the state where 
the defendant's act or omission occurred. Normally, and particularly 
when the defendant is the manufacturer or producer of goods, the 
place where the act or omission occurred will be a state in which 
the defendant is "present" and carrying on substantial business and 
thus subject to jurisdiction irrespective of the minimum contacts doc-
trine. The serious problems arise when the state where the product 
causes harm to the plaintiff seeks to assert its jurisdiction over the out-
of-state producer. 
There is a notable lack of consistency among the decisions that 
have considered the matter. In part this is due to variations in the 
wording of state statutes, so that some of the decisions denying juris-
diction may be predicated on the construction of statutory limitations 
on the exercise of jurisdiction rather than on a consideration of the 
underlying constitutional bases.105 But many of the decisions do rest 
on the due process issue, and there is a basic uncertainty as to what the 
minimum contacts doctrine permits in these cases. 
The principal cause for the uncertainty is the decision of the Su-
preme Court in Hanson v. Denckla,I°6 a case decided by a bare five-to-
four majority. The factual situation was complex; the following over-
simplification must suffice for this discussion. The case involved the 
disposition of the estate of a decedent who had died domiciled in Flor-
ida. The controversy was between parties claiming under the Florida 
probate and those claiming under powers of appointment contained in 
trusts that had been created when decedent-trustor was domiciled in 
Pennsylvania. The trusts were being administered by Delaware cor-
porate trustees. The other necessary parties either having been served 
in Florida or having appeared in the proceedings, Florida attempted to 
assert jurisdiction over the Delaware trustees by service on them in 
Delaware. The Delaware court refused to recognize the Florida judg-
ment against the trustees and the United States Supreme Court sustained 
that refusal, holding that the trustees were not subject to the jurisdiction 
of the Florida court and its judgment was not entitled to full faith and 
105. This is clearly the situation in Feathers v. McLucas, 15 N.Y.2d 443, 458, 209 
N.E.2d 68, 76, 261 N.Y.S.2d 8, 19 (1965). Feathers appears to have influenced the 
California courts of appeal in two cases: Leach Co. v. Superior Court, 266 Cal. App. 
2d 493, 72 Cal. Rptr. 216 (1968), and Gill v. Surgitool Inc., 256 Cal. App. 2d 583, 
64 Cal. Rptr. 207 (1967). 
106. 357 U.S. 235 (1958). 
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credit in Delaware. 
Language in the opinion indicates at least the possibility of a re-
turn to the idea that subjection to jurisdiction is conditioned on a 
privilege afforded the defendant and that unless the defendant has 
somehow entered the forum and enjoyed a privilege, jurisdiction does 
not exist: 
[T]his suit cannot be said to be one to enforce an obligation that 
arose from a privilege the defendant exercised in Florida. . . . 
. . . The application of that rule [minimum contacts] will vary 
with the quality and nature of the defendant's activity, but it is 
essential in each case that there be some act by which the defendant 
purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting activities 
within the forum State, thus invoking the benefits and protections 
of its laws.107 
In other words, the "minimum contacts" with the fo~m state re-
ferred to in International Shoe must amount to "purposeful availment" 
of the privilege of conducting activities in the forum state. Otherwise 
there will be no sufficient basis of jurisdiction; the traditional standards 
of "fair play and substantial justice" will not be satisfied. This "pur-
poseful availment" requirement represents the Supreme Court's first 
attempt to set a clear outer limit to the minimum contacts doctrine. 
If the Court's language is to be taken literally-if "the defendant 
[must] purposefully avail itself of the privilege of conducting activities 
within the forum state"-then some entry, personally or by agent, 
representative, distributor or salesman, would seem to be a prerequi-
site. Under such an interpretation, a producer who sold his entire 
output to independent distributors f.o.b. the state of production would 
not be conducting activities outside his home state and would not be 
subject to the jurisdiction of any other state. lOS 
It is submitted, however, that any such narrow, restricted approach 
to the minimum contacts doctrine is erroneous and should not be fol-
lowed. To look to the formalities of the sales transactions would be to 
107. Id. at 252-53. These passages were quoted with approval in the opinion 
of Mr. Justice Goldberg, in chambers, denying stay pending appeal, in Rosenblatt v. 
American Cyanamid Co., 86 S. Ct. 1 (1965). Note also the reference to "privilege" in 
International Shoe: "But to the extent that a corporation exercises the privilege of 
conducting activities within a state, it enjoys the benefits and protection of the laws of 
that state. The exercise of that privilege may give rise to obligations, and, so far as 
those obligations arise out of or are connected with the activities within the state, a 
procedure which requires the corporation to respond to a suit brought to enforce them 
can, in most instances, hardly be said to be undue." International Shoe Co. v. Wash-
ington, 326 U.S. 310, 319 (1945). 
108. This was the situation in daSiIveira v. Westphalia Separator Co., 248 Cal. 
App. 2d 789,57 Cal. Rptr. 62 (1967). 
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permit jurisdictional power to be governed by the defendant's mode of 
doing business and would enable a defendant to avoid the jurisdiction 
of a forum by billing, shipping, and marketing arrangements and de-
vices. It would reintroduce the technicalities that plagued courts under 
the old concepts of "presence" and "doing business." And, finally, 
it would be inconsistent with the underlying rationale of the Interna-
tional Shoe decision, which stressed the reasonableness of subjecting the 
defendant to suit in the forum, in the specific case brought there, 
rather than the mechanics of defendant's way of doing business. 
Most of the state court decisions have not accepted such a nar-
rowly restrictive view of the minimum contacts doctrine but have taken 
jurisdiction, or assumed they could have done so but for a limiting forum 
statute, in cases where the defendant did not enter the state or engage in 
any activity in the forum but did affect persons or property within the 
forum. 109 The exact point at which defendant's activities justify such 
jurisdiction has not been clearly marked; where it should be marked 
depends upon the view that is taken of the meaning and purport of the 
minimum contacts doctrine. It is well established in California that 
when a corporate defendant is engaged in the direct introduction of its 
product into the forum as part of a regular or continuous or substantial 
distribution system,110 or conducts its business under circumstances 
that it may reasonably expect that its products will be used or consumed 
in the forum in substantial quantities,111 the assumption of jurisdiction 
is consistent with due process if the cause of action arises out of an in-
jury caused by a product purchased and used in the forum. The de-
cisions are extremely inconsistent and confusing, however, in cases 
where the cause of action is against a supplier who has supplied an 
article sporadically or only once which when used in the forum, in-
jures person or property therein. 
Several decisions from other jurisdictions are of particular signifi-
109. See, e.g., Lotus Car Ltd. v. Municipal Court, 263 Cal. App. 2d 264, 69 Cal. 
Rptr. 384 (1968) (tort); Long v. Mishicot Modern Dairy, Inc., 252 Cal. App. 2d 425, 
60 Cal. Rptr. 432 (1967) (contract). 
11 o. "There are numerous 'flow of products in the stream of commerce' cases. 
One of them is Regie Nationale Des Usines Renault Billancourt (Seine), France v. 
Superior Court, [208 Cal. App. 2d 702, 25 Cal. Rptr. 530 (1962)], a decision of this 
court. It holds that a corporation created and owned by the French government 
which manufactured Renault automobiles and sold them to a New York corporation, a 
wholly owned subsidiary, who sold to various American distributors who sold to dealers 
who sold to consumers in California, could not by marketing through a 'hierarchy' of 
agents insulate itself against assertion of California jurisdiction." A.R. Indus., Inc. v. 
Superior Court, 268 Cal. App. 2d 328, 333, 73 Cal. Rptr. 920, 923 (1968). 
111. ct. O'Brien v. Comstock Foods, Inc., 123 Vt. 461, 194 A.2d 568 (1963). 
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cance in the interpretation of the minimum contacts doctrine as applied 
to out-of-state manufacturers and suppliers in products liability actions; 
they furnish a general background with which the state of California 
law may profitably be compared. Among these cases are Singer v. 
Walker,112 decided by the New York Court of Appeals in 1965, 
O'Brien v. Comstock Foods, Inc.,113 decided by the Vermont Supreme 
Court in 1963, and Gray v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary 
Corp.,114 decided by the lllinois Supreme Court in 1961. 
In Singer v. Walker, the defendant had manufactured a geologist's 
hammer in lllinois which was shipped f.o.b. lllinois to a dealer in New 
York who sold it to the plaintiff, who was injured while using it in 
Connecticut. The New York court had difficulty with the "tortious 
act" provision of the long-arm statute115 but sustained jurisdiction on 
the ground that "the cause of action asserted is clearly one 'arising 
from' the purposeful activities engaged in by the appellant in this 
State in connection with the sale of its products in the New York 
market."116 In Singer, New York seemed to take a liberal view of the 
jurisdictional issue. Purposeful sales to a New York dealer were held 
to constitute a sufficient contact, and no great importance was attached 
to the nature and extent of the defendant's in-state distribution system. 
In O'Brien, the Vermont plaintiff claimed damages from the pres-
112. 15 N.Y.2d 443, 464, 209 N.E.2d 68, 80, 261 N.Y.S.2d 8, 24 (1965). 
113. 123 Vt. 461, 194 A.2d 568 (1963). 
114. 22 lli. 2d 432, 176 N.E.2d 761 (1961). 
115. The New York long-arm statute in force at that time provided: "A court 
may exercise personal jurisdiction over any non-domiciliary . . . as to any cause of 
action arising from any of the acts enumerated in this section .•• if ... he: 
"2. commits a tortious act within the state .... " N.Y. CIv. PRAC. LAW § 302 
(a) (McKinney 1963). 
In a companion case to Singer v. Walker, the New York Court of Appeals 
held that the defendant had not committed a "tortious act" in New York within the 
meaning of the statute and therefore denied jurisdiction on statutory grounds without 
reaching the constitutional issue. Feathers v. McLucas, 15 N.Y.2d 443, 458, 209 N.E.2d 
68, 76, 261 N.Y.S.2d 8, 19 (1965). In Feathers, the defendant manufactured a steel 
tank in Kansas on order for a Missouri corporation "presumably with knowledge" 
that it would eventually be sold to an interstate carrier incorporated in Pennsylvania 
and would be used on the highways of several states, including New York. Plaintiffs 
sued for damages resulting from an explosion of the tank while being operated on a 
New York highway. 
As a result of the Feathers decision, the New York legislature quickly amended 
section 302(a) by adding subsection 3, which provides: "[Personal jurisdiction may be 
obtained over any non-domiciliary who] commits a tortious act without the state causing 
injury to person or property within the state .... " N.Y. CIv. PRAC. LAW § 302(a)(3) 
(McKinney Supp. 1969-70). 
116. 15 N.Y.2d at 467, 209 N.E.2d at 82, 261 N.Y.S.2d at 26-27. 
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ence of a deleterious substance in a can of beans which he had pur-
chased in Vermont and which had allegedly been prepared, packed 
and "placed in the stream of commerce" by defendant in New York. 
This, the Vermont court held, was not sufficient to justify jurisdiction; 
but the opinion added that if the defendant had voluntarily or deliber-
ately participated actively in the Vermont market "either by direct ship-
ment or by way of transmittal through regular distributors presently 
serving the Vermont market area" its jurisdiction could be sustained.1l7 
O'Brien thus illustrates a more restrictive and mechanical method of 
deciding the minimum contacts question-minimum contacts exist if 
either the defendant or its agents conduct certain well-defined business 
activities in the forum state. 
In Gray the situation was more complex. Plaintiff was injured in 
Illinois when a water heater exploded. The heater had been manu-
factured in Pennsylvania by defendant American Radiator and had been 
sold and installed in a home in Illinois. Jurisdiction over American 
Radiator was not questioned, but American Radiator cross-complained 
against a third party, Titan, who had manufactured a valve which had 
been incorporated in the heater and which was allegedly the cause of 
the explosion. Titan did business in Ohio where the valve had been 
manufactured and sold to American Radiator, but it did no business in 
Illinois. The illinois court asserted jurisdiction over Titan, stating: 
With the increasing specialization of commercial activity and the 
growing interdependence of business enterprises it is seldom that a 
manufacturer deals directly with consumers in other states. The 
fact that the benefit he derives from its laws is an indirect one, 
however, does not make it any the less essential to the conduct of 
his business; and it is not unreasonable, where a cause of action 
arises from alleged defects in his product, to say that the use of such 
products in the ordinary course of commerce is sufficient contact 
with this State to justify a requirement that he defend here.1lS 
Gray is a particularly notable case, for it appears to carry the mini-
mum contacts concept farther than any case to date, and perhaps as 
far as is possible within the limits set by Hanson v. Denckla. Under the 
Gray rule, an out-of-state manufacturer or supplier is amenable to 
long-arm jurisdiction in a products liability action whenever it is shown 
that he knowingly placed the defective product in the stream of inter-
state commerce. The Illinois court apparently did not require evidence 
that the defendant "purposefully" or foreseeably placed the product 
in the particular forum state; rather, it held that such particular place-
117. 123 Vt. at 464, 194 A.2d at 571. 
118. 22 III. 2d at 442, 176 N.E.2d at 766. 
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ment is always a foreseeable result of a more general introduction of 
the product into interstate commerce. 
Until very recently, the California courts appeared to be pursuing 
two separate approaches, with sometimes one and sometimes the other 
predominating. Some of the decisions emphasized a concept of fair-
ness based on balancing the respective conveniences and inconveniences 
to the parties between suit in plaintiff's forum state and suit in defend-
ant's home state. In other decisions, the nature of the sales and distri-
bution system was regarded as decisive; jurisdiction was denied unless 
defendant, by sales agents, retail outlets, or some other readily identifi-
able distribution system, could be said to be actively entering into and 
participating in the California market.119 
The most significant decision during this period was Cosper v. 
Smith & Wesson Arms CO.120 In Cosper, defendant was held subject to 
the jurisdiction of the California courts in an action for injuries received 
in California, resulting from the explosion of a gun manufactured by de-
fendant and purchased from a retailer in California. Defendant did not 
do business in California in the traditional sense; it was a Massachusetts 
corporation and distributed its products f.o.b. its plant in Massachusetts, 
through independent distributors and sales representatives. Sales pro-
motion in California was by an independent company which represented 
various manufacturers on a nonexclusive basis. The court held that it 
had jurisdiction of the case, reasoning that the representative, by "serv-
icing dealer accounts, investigating and recommending prospective 
dealers to Smith and Wesson, arranging publicity, distributing adver-
tising, and handling and reporting complaints" was performing the 
same functions and rendering the same services that the defendant 
would have, if it had been operating through its own office or paid 
sales force. Also, "the gun which exploded was sold in this state, 
the accident occurred in this state, the plaintiff is a resident of this 
state, and many of the witnesses who will probably be called at the 
trial are present in this state."121 
119. Compare Fisher Governor Co. v. Superior Court, 53 Cal. 2d 222, 347 P.2d 
1, 1 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1959), and A.R. Indus., Inc. v. Superior Court, 268 Cal. App. 2d 
328, 73 Cal. Rptr. 920 (1968), with daSilveira v. Westphalia Separator Co., 248 Cal. 
App. 2d 789, 57 Cal. Rptr. 62 (1967), Twinco Sales, Inc. v. Superior Court, 230 Cal. 
App. 2d 321, 40 Cal. Rptr. 833 (1964), and Yeck Mfg. Corp. v. Superior Court, 202 
Cal. App. 2d 645, 21 Cal. Rptr. 51 (1962). For further discussion of these two 
approaches see note 123 & text accompanying notes 147-51 infra. 
120. 53 Cal. 2d 77, 346 P.2d 409 (1959). 
121. [d. at 81, 83, 346 P.2d at 412-13. 
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(2) Buckeye Boiler Co. v. Superior Court 
In the recent case of Buckeye Boiler Co. v. Superior Court,122 
the California Supreme Court expressly disapproved any jurisdictional 
test that depended on the mechanics of the defendant's distribution sys-
tem123 and postulated in its stead a three step analysis of the relationship 
between defendant's business activities and the forum state. In Buck-
eye, the defendant was an Ohio corporation with its principal place 
of business in that state. It had sales representatives in some states 
but not in others. It solicited sales directly in some states but not 
in others. It did not advertise its products. It maintained no sales 
agency, representation, outlet or any other means of solicitation of 
orders in California. Its only identifiable activity in California was 
122. 71 A.C. 933, 458 P.2d 57, 80 Cal. Rptr. 113 (1969). 
123. In some of the pre-Buckeye court of appeal decisions, the nature of the sales 
distribution system was regarded as decisive of jurisdiction. This was particularly true 
in three decisions where jurisdiction was denied: Yeck Mfg. Corp. v. Superior Court, 
202 Cal. App. 2d 645, 21 Cal. Rptr. 51 (1962); Twinco Sales, Inc. v. Superior Court, 
230 Cal. App. 2d 321, 40 Cal. Rptr. 833 (1964); daSilveira v. Westphalia Separator 
Co., 248 Cal. App. 2d 789, 57 Cal. Rptr. 62 (1967). 
In Yeck, the defendant, a Michigan manufacturer, sold to a California distributor 
who in tum sold to a California retailer. In Twinco, the defendant sold to an out-of-
state distributor who in tum sold to a California retailer. In daSilveira, the defendant, 
a German corporation, sold to a New York corporation that had exclusive distribution 
rights, and the distributor in tum sold to plaintiff. In all three cases, the courts 
found a lack of contact between the defendant and the forum to support jurisdiction. 
See the analysis in Yeck. 202 Cal. App. 2d at 651-53, 21 Cal. Rptr. at 54-56. In 
daSilveira, the court relied particularly on the decision in Hanson v. Denckla, pointing 
out that "there was no act by which [the defendant had] purposefully availed itself of 
[any] privilege of conducting business in California." 248 Cal. App. 2d at 793, 57 Cal. 
Rptr. at 65. 
In Lotus Car Ltd. v. Municipal Court, 263 Cal. App. 2d 264, 69 Cal. Rptr. 384 
(1968), the nature of the sales and distribution system was regarded as significant, the 
court stating: "[T]he real party in interest proved ... that petitioner is listed in the 
telephone directory in three California counties; that a firm in one of these counties 
advertises sales, parts and accessories for petitioner's cars; and that four named dis-
tributors in this state are actively engaged in sales promotion and service of petitioner's 
cars. This evidence supports a finding that there were minimum contacts sufficient to 
sustain service of process upon petitioner." Id. at 271, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 389. See also 
Sales Affiliates, Inc. v. Superior Court, 96 Cal. App. 2d 134, 214 P.2d 541 (1950). 
"If the representation which petitioner maintained in the state gave it in a practical 
sense, and to a substantial degree, the benefits and advantages it would have enjoyed by 
operating through its own office or paid sales force, it was clearly doing business in 
the state so as to be amenable to civil process. 
" ... Petitioner's methods ... would appear to give it substantially the same 
commercial advantages that would be available to it through an office or a force of 
employees maintained in the state devoted exclusively to this phase of the business." 
Id. at 136-37, 214 P.2d at 542-43. The above language was quoted with approval in 
Cosper v. Smith & Wesson Arms Co., 53 Cal. 2d 77, 82-83, 346 P.2d 409, 413 (1959). 
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some sales of pressure tanks to the Cochin Manufacturing Company, 
located in South San Francisco, which Cochin incorporated in a product 
it manufactured and sold. The cause of action in the specific suit 
before the court arose when a pressure tank manufactured by Buckeye 
exploded in a General Electric plant in California and injured the plain-
tiff. There was nothing to indicate how that particular tank came to be 
in California, or even how it came into the possession of General Elec-
tric. There was no connection between defendant's business with Cochin 
and the tank which caused plaintiff's injury. 
On the basis of the record before it, the California Supreme Court 
held that a prima facie showing of jurisdiction had been established. 
The end result is sound; however, the process by which the court 
reached that result is not as clear as it might be, and the opinion raises 
several questions that are likely to cause difficulty in subsequent cases. 
Initially it should be noted that in holding that a prima facie case 
had been established, the court stated that "[t]he plaintiff has the 
burden of showing that a defendant is doing business in California for 
purposes of section 411 of the Code of Civil Procedure."124 However, 
when plaintiff establishes that a substantial amount of defendant's busi-
ness is conducted through channels of interstate commerce and de-
fendant does engage in some "substantial economic activity" in the 
state, the burden125 passes to the defendant to show that the presence of 
the object which injured the plaintiff was fortuitous and unforeseeable 
and that the defense of the particular action would be unreasonably 
burdensome to defendant.126 
Also preliminarily, it should be noted that the decision is not a 
final determination of Buckeye's amenability to jurisdiction in a Cali-
fornia forum. The court noted that Buckeye's position in the trial 
court had been predicated largely upon state appellate decisions stress-
ing the importance of a sales or distribution system in the forum state.127 
These decisions were disapproved,128 and Buckeye was afforded the 
124. 71 A.C. at 945 n.9, 458 P.2d at 66 n.9, 80 Cal. Rptr. at 122 n.9. 
125. The court did not specify whether this "burden of proof" is the burden of 
producing evidence or the burden of persuading the trier of fact by a preponderance of 
the evidence. See generally CAL. EVID. CODE § 115. 
126. 71 A.C. at 945 n.9, 458 P.2d at 66 n.9, 80 Cal. Rptr. at 122 n.9. 
127. E.g., Gill v. Surgitool, Inc., 256 Cal. App. 2d 583, 64 Cal. Rptr. 207 (1967); 
daSiIveira v. Westphalia Separator Co., 248 Cal. App. 2d 789, 57 Cal. Rptr. 62 
(1967); Twinco Sales, Inc. v. Superior Court, 230 Cal. App. 2d 321, 40 Cal. Rptr. 833 
(1964); Yeck Mfg. Corp. v. Superior Court; 202 Cal. App. 2d 645, 21 Cal. Rptr. 51 
(1962). For a discussion of this mechanical "checklist" approach, see note 123 and 
text accompanying notes 119-23 supra. 
128. 71 A.C. at 943, 458 P.2d at 65, 80 Cal. Rptr. at 121. 
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opportunity of making a further evidentiary showing before the trial 
court, in conformity with the legal principles announced in the supreme 
court opinion.129 
(i) Obtaining Economic Benefit from Sales Within the State-
Purposeful A vailment As a Matter of Commercial Actuality 
Turning to the main thrust of the opinion, the court stated three 
separate conditions that had to be met before jurisdiction could con-
stitutionally be assumed. First, to comply with Hanson v. Denckla, 
there must be some act "by which the defendant purposefully avails 
itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum state. "130 
Second, "the particular cause of action must arise out of or be con-
nected with the defendant's forum-related activity." 131 Third, there 
must be a determination that it is fair to proceed based "upon a balanc-
ing of the inconvenience to the defendant in having to defend itself in 
the forum state against both the interest of the plaintiff in suing locally 
and the interrelated interest of the state in assuming jurisdiction."132 
The court attempted to satisfy the first of its three conditions and 
the rule of Hanson v. Denckla on the basis of defendant's transactions 
with Cochin Manufacturing Company by stating: 
In the present case, it is clear that defendant derives sub-
stantial economic benefit from the sale and use of its products in 
California; it currently derives about $30,000 annually in gross 
sales revenues from its direct sales of certain pressure tanks to the 
Cochin Manufacturing Company plant in South San Francisco. 
On the basis of these sales alone, defendant is purposefully engaging 
in economic activity within California as a matter of "commercial 
actuality."133 
However, since the injury admittedly was not caused by any 
product that defendant sold to Cochin, the linkage between the first 
condition and the second condition was apparently lacking. To pro-
vide the connection, the court offered a two-span bridge. The first 
span was that somehow the use of the tank that injured plaintiff, to-
gether with the sales to Cochin, could be taken together as defendant's 
"total economic activity in Califomia"134 and therefore "plaintiffs 
cause of action appears to arise from Buckeye's economic activity in 
129. [d. at 945-46,458 P.2d at 66, 80 Cal. Rptr. at 122. 
130. [d. at 938, 458 P.2d at 62, 80 Cal. Rptr. at 118, quoting Hanson v. Denckla, 
357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958). 
131. 71 A.C. at 939,458 P.2d at 62,80 Cal. Rptr. at 118. 
132. [d. 
133. [d. at 944, 458 P.2d at 65, 80 Cal. Rptr. at 121. 
134. /d. 
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California, to wit, the totality of its sales of pressure tanks to California 
customers or to other customers for foreseeable resale or use in Califor-
nia.»135 The other span was that for all that appeared in the record, 
Buckeye was engaged in the manufacture and distribution of pressure 
tanks in such a fashion that it was both reasonable and foreseeable that 
its products (apart from sales to Co chin) might well be used in Cali-
fornia.136 
However, the exact nature of this second span becomes confusing 
because of the court's lack of clarity in its exposition-was it con-
cerned with the foreseeability of the presence of the particular tank 
which injured plaintiff, or merely with the foreseeability of the presence 
of pressure tanks in the ordinary course of business? This confusion is 
illustrated by two statements in the opinion. At one point the court 
states: "Buckeye did not allege before the trial court that the tank 
which allegedly injured plaintiff arrived in California in a manner so 
fortuitous and unforeseeable as to demonstrate that its placement here 
was not purposefu1.»137 Here obviously the emphasis is on the particu-
lar tank. But later in the opinion the court states: "The plaintiff has 
made a sufficient prima facie showing that his injury arose from or is 
connected with purposeful activity in California-direct and indirect 
sales of pressure tanks-which produces economic benefit for Buckeye 
as a matter of 'commercial actuality.' "138 Here, equally obviously, the 
emphasis is on the general nature of the business and not on the process 
which brought the offending tank to California. 
It is submitted that in its statement and application of the first two 
conditions, the court has confused the jurisdictional issues and has 
failed satisfactorily to answer these basic questions: What is the real 
significance, if any, of the sales to Cochin; and is it essential that the 
presence of the particular offending tank be foreseeable? 
With respect to the sales to Cochin, it is suggested that they are 
entirely irrelevant except as a makeweight. It is not even arguable 
that Buckeye's sales to Cochin constituted "doing business" under the 
traditional pre-International Shoe doctrine, and hence those sales could 
not support a finding of "presence" sufficient to support jurisdiction on 
an unrelated cause of action.139 It is admitted that the cause of action 
sued upon did not arise out of Buckeye's sales to Cochin. Therefore, 
135. ld. at 945, 458 P.2d at 66, 80 Cal. Rptr. at 122. 
136. ld. at 944, 458 P.2d at 65-66, 80 Cal. Rptr. at 121-22. 
137. ld. at 945, 458 P.2d at 66, 80 Cal. Rptr. at 122. 
138. ld. at 947, 458 P.2d at 67, 80 Cal. Rptr. at 123. 
139. See id. at 938-39, 458 P.2d at 61,80 Cal. Rptr. at 117. 
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the right of plaintiff to maintain the action should depend upon the 
character of the activities that resulted in the offending product being 
present in California and not on the character of other activities having 
no relation to the offending product or its presence in California. In 
the setting of Buckeye Boiler, the Cochin sales helped plaintiff. But the 
critical question is whether, if there had been no sales to Cochin, juris-
diction over Buckeye would have been constitutionally permissible. 
The court's emphasis in parts of the opinion on the Cochin sales would 
seem to indicate its view that jurisdiction could not be taken. However, 
the court's position on the necessity of the Co chin sales was not per-
fectly clear. In another part of the opinion, the court seemed to recog-
nize that the exploding tank, by itself, could have supported jurisdic-
tion if its presence within the state was not so fortuitous and unforsee-
able as to "manifest lack of purposeful activity on the part of the manu-
facturer."14o 
(ii) A Foreseeability Test 
It is submitted that the uncertainties in Buckeye should be re-
solved in favor of applying a foreseeability test in cases of this type. 
There should be no requirement of activity in the forum by agents 
or representatives or of sales to known purchasers in the forum. The 
proper basis is: The defendant should be subject to suit in the plain-
tiff's forum whenever, by the manner in which he conducts his busi-
ness or carries on his activity, he might reasonably expect a harm-
ful effect in the forum where harm does, in fact, ensue. Thus if 
the defendant corporation either engages in nationwide distribution 
of its product or knowingly introduces its product into a particular 
forum, it should be subject to suit there for harm resulting from a defect 
in that product. 141 
On this basis, the existence of a distribution system in the forum 
is relevant on the issue of whether the defendant could reasonably have 
anticipated the distribution and use of his product in the forum state. 
But an actual distribution system in that forum is not necessary, and 
Buckeye, by its repudiation of that rationale used by some of the earlier 
cases,142 greatly assists in clarifying the doctrine. But that clarifica-
tion is unfortunately offset by the suggestion that except in one situa-
tion, if the particular tank that injured plaintiff had arrived in Cali-
140. Id. at 944, 458 P.2d at 65, 80 Cal. Rptr. at 121. 
141. See Gray v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 22 Ill. 2d 432, 
176 N.E.2d 761 (1961). 
142. These cases are cited in note 127 supra. 
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fornia in a fortuitous and unforeseeable manner, jurisdiction could 
not be taken.143 This apparent emphasis on how the tank that ex-
ploded came to be in California, rather than an emphasis on the gen-
eral nature of Buckeye'S business and the foreseeability of Buckeye's 
tanks in general being put to use in California and elsewhere, seems 
misplaced. There is little doubt, from a reading of the opinion, that it 
was foreseeable that Buckeye tanks were likely to be in use everywhere 
in the United States.144 And it is suggested that the correct rule-and 
the one apparently accepted by the New York145 and lllinois146 courts-
is that it is not how the particular offending article came into the forum 
but whether it is foreseeable that any of defendant's products, but not 
necessarily any particular one, would be put to use in the forum. 
Such an approach, it is submitted, is entirely consistent with the 
minimum contacts doctrine as originally expounded in International 
Shoe and as subsequently interpreted in McGee and Hanson. The 
crucial issue, as posited by International Shoe, was whether the de-
fendant was linked to the forum by a contact sufficient to justify sub-
jecting him to that forum's jurisdiction. McGee recognized that physi-
cal entry into the state was not necessary to effect such a contact, but that 
correspondence with an identified person in the forum sufficed. The 
limitation imposed by Hanson, under the facts of that case, may-and it 
is suggested should-mean no more than that any such contact must 
be attributable in some manner to the action or activity of the defendant 
and not to the action or activity of a third person. But when the manu-
facturer or producer proceeds to put his product into a stream of com-
merce that is designed, or is likely to, and in fact does, end in use, con-
sumption, or effect in the forum, the contact is established and is at-
143. This exceptional situation arises where the out-of-state defendant has en-
gaged, as did Buckeye, in some "substantial economic activity" (e.g., sales to Cochin 
Mfg. Co.). The court in Buckeye held that in this situation, in order to defeat juris-
diction, the defendant must prove both that the tank entered California in so fortuitous 
and unforeseeable manner as to demonstrate that its placement there was not purpose-
ful, and that the burden of defending the present action in California would be sub-
stantially different in its nature and extent than the burden of defending actions that 
might arise from the sale of pressure tanks to Co chin. 71 A.C. at 945, 458 P.2d at 66, 
80 Cal. Rptr. at 122. See text accompanying notes 124-26 supra. Thus, there can be 
situations, according to Buckeye, where jurisdiction will be upheld even though the 
injury-producing product has arrived in the forum completely fortuitously and unfore-
seeably. 
144. See 71 A.C. at 937, 458 P.2d at 60-61, 80 Cal. Rptr. at 116-17. 
145. Singer v. Walker, 15 N.Y.2d 443, 464, 209 N.E.2d 68, 80, 261 N.Y.S.2d 8, 24 
(1965). 
146. Gray v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 22 TIl. 2d 432, 176 
N.E.2d 761 (1961). 
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tributable to the action or activity of defendant. This, it seems, is the 
teaching of McGee; by a parity of reasoning, if the trust in Hanson had 
been executed after the trustor became domiciled in Florida, there seems 
no reason to doubt the ability of Florida to subject the trustee to its 
jurisdiction, even though all arrangements were made at the home 
office in Delaware and no agent or officer of the trustee ever set foot in 
Florida. 
If this approach is correct, then direct sales to unrelated purchasers 
are not necessary if the introduction of the product into the forum was 
foreseeable. And this, by a sort of inverse logic, appears to be the 
necessary result of the repeated references by the court in Buckeye to 
the requirement that the presence of the defective tank not be fortui-
tous or unforeseeable. The injury admittedly arose from the explosion 
in California of a tank manufactured by the defendant. Whatever 
cause of action there might have been came to fruition in California. 
If the defendant's other activities were sufficient to satisfy the minimum 
contacts doctrine-the purposeful availment or the activity in the forum 
-then it should not matter how or in what manner the particular offend-
ing tank came to rest in the forum state. But if it is important to de-
termine how, or in what manner that tank came to rest in California, it 
is only because that event, and no other, must provide the jurisdictional 
predicate under the minimum contacts doctrine. 
(iii) Balance of Conveniences 
Although the Buckeye decision disapproved one of the two major 
themes that ran through the prior California cases, it reemphasized with-
out any substantial variation the second theme-the idea that "the 
propriety of an assumption of [long-arm] jurisdiction depend[ed] [in 
part] upon a balancing of the inconvenience to the defendant in having 
to defend itself in the forum state against both the interest of the plain-
tiff in suing locally and the interrelated interest of the state in assuming 
jurisdiction."147 This balance of convenience concept-the third con-
dition stated in Buckeye-is a theme first expounded by the California 
Supreme Court in Fisher Governor Co. v. Superior Court.148 Among 
the matters there alluded to were: 
The interest of the state in providing a forum for its residents 
. . . the relative availability of evidence and the burden of defense 
and prosecution in one place rather than another, the ease of access 
to an alternate forum, the avoidance of multiplicity of suits and 
147. 71 A.C. at 939,458 P.2d at 62,80 Cal. Rptr. at 118. 
148. 53 Cal. 2d 222, 347 P.2d 1, 1 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1959). 
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conflicting adjudications, and the extent to which the cause of ac-
tion arose out of defendant's local activities.149 
1199 
What was probably the fullest exposition of this view was in A.R. In-
dustries, Inc. v. Superior Court:150 
[A.R.] Industries maintained no office, owned no property, sent no 
traveling salesmen, into California. But it did advertise in national 
media and the products described above had been sold and de-
livered by Industries into California for use (as distinct from re-
sale). We do not deem the fact decisive but the infrequency of 
California transactions may be r:elated to the fact that these ma-
chines were manufactured to specification and were of a size and 
nature calculated to supply a restricted market. "Minimum con-
tacts" in California were established. We turn to "traditional no-
tions of fair play and substantial justice." Industries has bene-
fited by, and received the protection of, the laws of California. It 
thus owed corresponding obligations. The cause of action arose 
here. We balance the inconvenience to Industries in coming into 
California to defend this suit against the probability that indispens-
able witnesses probably reside here, and we consider the cost, the 
difficulty, and perhaps the impossibility of ascertainment of truth 
of the merits of Cervantes' [plaintiff's] claim should it have to pro-
secute its claim in an eastern jurisdiction.151 
It is suggested that the supreme court, in Buckeye, passed up an op-
portunity to make clear whether it is concerned with this balance of 
convenience as a condition for the constitutional exercise of jurisdic-
tion, or the discretionary exercise of jurisdiction by consideration of 
forum non conveniens.152 These are two fundamentally different con-
cepts, with distinctly different results for the plaintiff. For if the 
issue of reasonableness is part of the jurisdictional test in a constitu-
tional sense and may result in a dismissal for want of jurisdiction, the 
application of the statute of limitations may leave plaintiff without a 
remedy. But if the issue of reasonableness is a discretionary one, under 
forum non conveniens, the court may condition a dismissal on defend-
ant's waiver of any statute of limitations and thus preserve plaintiff's 
rights.ll1B 
,149. ld. at 225-26,347 P.2d at 3-4, 1 Cal. Rptr. at 3-4 (citations omitted). 
150. 268 Cal. App. 2d 328, 73 Cal. Rptr. 920 (1968). 
151. ld. at 336, 73 Cal. Rptr. at 925. 
152. A companion provision of new section 410.10 codifies the doctrine of forum 
non conveniens. See CAL. CODE CIV. PRoe. § 410.30 (operative July 1, 1970). For a 
more extended discussion of the doctrine as it relates to California and the relation it 
bears to constitutional jurisdiction questions, see Note, Forum Non Conveniens in Cal-
ifornia: Code of Civil Procedure Section 410.30, 21 HASTINGS L.J. 1245 (1970). 
153. Vargas v. A.H. Bull S.S. Co., 25 NJ. 293, 135 A.2d 857 (1957), cert. denied, 
355 U.S. 958 (1958); Aetna Ins. Co. v. Creole Petroleum Corp., 27 App. Div. 2d 518, 
275 N.Y.S.2d 274 (1966); Wendel v. Hoffman, 259 App. Div. 732, 18 N.Y.S.2d 96 
(1940). 
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This matter needs to be clarified, and it is to be hoped that the 
court will clarify it in the direction of the applicability of the doctrine 
of forum non conveniens and not as an independent jurisdictional 
ground. As first expounded in International Shoe, the reasonableness 
of suit in the forum was expressed in terms of a consequence flowing 
from the existence of minimum contacts and not as a separate standard. 
The language used was: "[S]uch contacts of the corporation with the 
state of the forum as make it reasonable. . . to require the corporation 
to defend the particular suit which is brought there."154 This would 
seem to imply that if the contacts were adequate, the maintenance of 
the suit was per se reasonable. 
As a practical matter, however, it is not likely that the balance, on 
the issue of reasonableness, will ever preponderate against the state in 
which the injury occurred. Four factors appear to enter into the deter-
mination of reasonableness: financial burden, possibility of a "home 
town" decision, availability of evidence and knowledge of applicable 
law, and finally avoidance of a mUltiplicity of actions. 
With respect to financial burden, all factors favor the state of in-
jury, particularly when that state is also the state of plaintiffs residence. 
Usually he will be without resources adequate to prosecute the case 
elsewhere, whereas the defendant can usually include the cost of de-
fense as part of the cost of doing business and spread the risk of litiga-
tion over the entire commercial enterprise. 
With respect to fairness in end result and the dangers of a "home 
town" decision, there would seem to be little danger of local prejudice 
in most tort cases (except for the defamation cases, which present a 
special problem), 155 and to the extent that there might be some such 
possibility, the plaintiff is as likely to be prejudiced by suit against the 
defendant in his home as the defendant is in the reverse situation. At 
the very best, in the ordinary tort case, the possibilities of prejudice for 
or against either party are no more likely to exist in the one state than 
in the other. 
With respect to availability of evidence and familiarity with con-
trolling law, the odds are heavily weighted in favor of the state where 
the injury occurred. Normally, that is where the eye witnesses to the 
event, the product itself, the medical testimony, in fact nearly every 
item of proof will be located. Only when there is a substantial issue 
of whether due care was exercised in the manufacture of the product-
154. 326 U.s. at 317. 
155. See text accompanying notes 168-88 infra. 
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an issue that is rapidly disappearing as strict liability supersedes negli-
gence in the field of products liability156-will there be material evi-
dence in the defendant's home state. And under prevailing conflict of 
laws doctrine, the forum in which the injury occurred will also be the 
state whose law will govern, unless the introduction of the product 
therein and the ensuing injury in that locale were purely fortuitous.151 
Finally, in the products liability cases there are usually two and 
often three defendants: the local retailer or distributor or user, the 
regional intermediate distributor, and the national manufacturer. Juris-
diction over the local defendant may be assumed in most of the cases 
from the fact that his place of business is in the forum; it may also be 
assumed that in most cases the retailer will seek relief from his supplier 
or from the ultimate manufacturer. Unless all issues of liability among 
all parties can be settled in one action, there is grave danger of injustice 
because of different courts reaching different results, either on different 
evidence or on different theories of liability. And even when the re-
sults in all actions coincide, there is still the advantage of avoiding a 
multiplicity of suits. 
(3) Additional Problems 
There are two aspects of the broad problem which do not fit pre-
cisely the pattern and analysis of the minimum contacts doctrine. One 
is the case of a retail merchant doing business in an area that extends 
over two states, with his outlet in one state and many of his customers in 
the other.158 If, in such a case, the merchant conducts all operations, 
including sale or service and delivery, in his own state, he will never in-
ject himself into-will never have a "contact" with-the other state. 
In the event of harm to person or property in the second state from a 
defective product, can jurisdiction be maintained in that second state? 
All of the arguments for convenience of parties and witnesses and rea-
sonableness of forum would support such jurisdiction, but under Han-
son, such convenience is not enough.159 Because there is no activity 
156. See Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 
Cal. Rptr. 697 (1963); REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965). 
157. SECOND REsTATEMENT OF CONFLICTS § 145, comment e at 11. 
158. The Stateline area of South Lake Tahoe might well present such problems. 
159. Hanson warns that "restrictions on the personal jurisdiction of state 
courts . • . are more than a guarantee of immunity from inconvenient or distant 
litigation. They are a consequence of territorial limitations on the power of the 
respective states." 357 U.S. at 251. It would seem that unless and until Hanson 
is expressly overrnled on this point, the boundary line will govern. But ct. Gray v. 
American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 22 m. 2d 432, 176 N.E.2d 761 (1961). 
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by the defendant in the second state, no credit extended to customers in 
that state, the argument could be made that the defendant has not pur-
posefully availed himself of the privilege of conducting business in 
that state. This argument, however, is likely to fail in view of Buckeye's 
discussion of foreseeability and its equation of purposeful availment with 
economic benefit. 
The other special problem arises where the manufacturer conducts 
his business in one state, the purchaser obtains the product from a re-
tailer in a second state, and the injury results while the article is being 
used in still a third state. The New York case of Singer v. Walker160 is 
a prototype of this situation, and it seems clear that the New York court 
was correct in taking jurisdiction because the sale was made there. But 
to pose a variation on Singer-what if Singer had chosen to sue in 
Connecticut, where the injury occurred? Or what if, in Cosper, 161 
plaintiff had been injured by the defective gun while hunting in Mon-
tana and elected to sue there? We may assume in these hypothetical 
situations that the nature of defendant's business is such that it has 
"minimum contacts" with each state, but is the suit maintainable in 
both the state of purchase and the state of injury, or in only one, and if 
so in which one? Elements of convenience and reasonableness with 
respect to trial would favor jurisdiction only in the state where the in-
jury occurred. But can it be said, consistent with International Shoe, 
that a suit in the state of injury arose out of defendant's contacts with 
that state? There is, as yet, no authoritative answer to these questions. 
It is suggested that since the connection between the cause of action 
and the contact is in the state where the article was purchased, and to 
avoid the possibility of a basic jurisdictional defect, suit in such cases 
should not be brought in the state of injury. 
Thus far the discussion has been limited to the fields of products 
liability. To round out the discussion we need to consider, and, by 
analogy, apply the same doctrines to various miscellaneous torts. 
"[T]he trend in defining due process of law is away from the emphasis on territorial 
limitations and toward emphasis on providing adequate notice and opportunity to be 
heard: from the court with immediate power over the defendant, toward the court 
in which both parties can most conveniently settle their dispute." Id. at 440-41, 176 
N.E.2d at 765. 
160. 15 N.Y.2d 443, 464, 209 N.E.2d 68, 80,261 N.Y.S.2d 8, 24 (1965); see text 
accompanying notes 115-16 supra. 
161. Cosper v. Smith & Wesson Arms Co., 53 Cal. 2d 77, 346 P.2d 409 (1959); 
see text accompanying notes 119-21 supra. 
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D. Other Torts 
(1) False Imprisonment 
Normally confinement will be by act of the defendant personally, 
or by agent, within the forum. and will be indistinguishable in its juris-
dictional aspects from the intentional torts of battery and assault. How-
ever, if the imprisonment is accomplished by action in another state 
which sets in motion the force that confines the plaintiff, jurisdiction 
should be maintainable on the same basis as in the case of the supplier 
supplying a known user in the forum.162 
(2) Abuse 0/ Process and Malicious Prosecution 
The appropriate forum here should be the state out of which the 
process issued. There is no doubt that an out-of-state defendant who 
procures the issuance of process by a forum court, for the purpose of 
harassing or interfering with person or property within the forum, is 
subject to jurisdiction under even the strictest and most limited interpre-
tation of Hanson v. Denckla. What is not so clear is whether the state 
of plaintiff's residence may assume jurisdiction when the process was 
issued in ~other state with the intent of harassing the plaintiff or inter-
fering directly or indirectly with his activities in the forum. So long as 
Hanson remains, with its emphasis on some act by which the defendant 
purposefully availed himself of a forum privilege, it would seem that 
jurisdiction could not be maintained by the plaintiff's state in the latter 
situation. But if Hanson is limited to permit a wider range to the 
plaintiff's choice of forum, the factors of reasonableness and fairness 
would seem to favor jurisdiction in the plaintiff's home state.163 
(3) Fraud 
There are several different factual situations which may furnish 
the basis for the exercise of jurisdiction in a fraud case. The most ob-
vious situation is where the defendant, while personally present in Cali-
fornia, makes the representations which are the gravamen of the action 
in a personal encounter with the plaintiff. Here both the wrongful act 
and the harm to plaintiff occur in California, and exercise of jurisdiction 
is clearly proper.164 
Another situation is where the defendant, by mail or other means of 
162. See Ehrenzweig, The Place of Acting in Intentional Multistate Torts: Law 
and Reason Versus the Restatement, 36 MINN. L. REv. 1, 18-19 (1951). 
163. See generally Buckeye Boiler Co. v. Superior Court, 71 A.c. 933, 458 P.2d 
57, 80 Cal. Rptr. 113 (1969); Currie, The Growth of the Long Arm: Eight Years of 
Extended Jurisdiction in Illinois, 1963 U. ILL. L.F. 533, 544-60. 
164. Cf. Ehrenzweig, supra note 162. 
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communication from outside California addressed to the plaintiff in the 
forum, makes the representations which are the gravamen of the ac-
tion. Here the wrongful act of the defendant occurs outside the forum; 
it may be that the defendant never entered the forum in connection 
with the transaction. It is submitted that this is a proper case for 
forum jurisdiction by analogy to McGee v. International Life Insurance 
Co. 
The third situation is where the subject matter of the transaction, 
concerning which the representations are made, is physically located in 
California, but both parties are nonresidents of the state and all con-
tacts between them take place outside the state. In this situation it is 
possible to support jurisdiction in the state. There is a contact with the 
state in that the subject matter is located here, and this should be suffi-
cient for jurisdiction. But this contact seems insubstantial with respect 
to the matters of fairness to the parties and the opportunity for a trial in 
a jurisdiction bearing a reasonable relation to parties and issues. There 
is no indication that any interest of the state will suffer as a result of the 
conduct of the parties. There is nothing to indicate that a trial in Cali-
fornia is fairer to the parties than a trial in the state of defendant's resi-
dence or plaintiffs residence. About the only justification that can be 
urged is the convenience of obtaining evidence and producing witnesses 
concerning the value of the local property.IG5 
(4) Interference with Business Relations-Unfair Competition 
and Inducing Breach of Contract 
It may be assumed that if the action is brought in California it will 
normally involve both a business carried on in California and acts by 
defendant in, or involving persons or property in, California. In such 
cases courts have sustained jurisdiction over the defendant served out-
side the state.16G 
However, a situation may be posited in which the defendant, for 
the purpose of injuring a competitor in California, engages in unfair 
competition wholly outside the state, either by inducing an out-of-state 
supplier to cut off the plaintiffs supply or by inducing out-of-state 
purchasers to cease doing business with the plaintiff. In such a case, if 
Hanson is strictly and literally followed, it would appear that no juris-
165. See the balancing test used by the courts in the cases cited in note 163 and 
in the text accompanying notes 148, 150 supra. 
166. See Opinion of Mr. Justice Goldberg, in chambers, on denial of stay pending 
appeal in Rosenblatt v. American Cyanamid Co., 86 S. Ct. 1 (1965); Carl F.W. Borg-
ward v. Superior Court, 51 Cal. 2d 72,330 P.2d 790 (1958); Henry R. Jahn & Son v. 
Superior Court, 49 Cal. 2d 855, 323 P.2d 438 (1958). 
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diction exists in California, but it is suggested that the rationale that 
supports jurisdiction in the case of the producer who puts his goods in 
the stream of commerce, knowing they will be distributed in the 
forum, should equally support jurisdiction in the unfair competition 
situation.167 
(5) Defamation and Privacy 
Actions for defamation and invasion of privacy present special 
problems, and long-arm jurisdiction in these cases seems to be de-
veloping under special rules. 1GB Thus far these rules have been applied 
on an ad hoc basis without any clear pattern emerging. The United 
States Supreme Court has not spoken on the issue, and the principal 
decisions are from the Federal Courts of Appeals in the Second and 
Fifth Circuits. 
The unique problem in these cases is the obvious danger inherent 
in subjecting the media of public information and opinion to defamation 
or privacy actions in the plaintiff's home state when the publication 
concerns emotionally charged political issues or controversial public 
figures. What seems to have developed thus far is an attempt to arrive 
at a reasonable balance between the plaintiff's interest in bringing the 
action in his home state and the potential danger that defense in the 
plaintiff's state might subject the defendant to the risk of an unreason-
able result in both liability and damages. 
Under a normal analysis of the minimum contacts doctrine, a de-
famatory publication must be regarded as producing its harm in the 
state where the object of the publication resides or where his principal 
activities are centered. And one who publishes a defamatory article 
about a well-known public figure in a media having wide circulation 
can hardly contend that there was no regular and continuous distribu-
tion of the pUblication in the plaintiff's home state, or that substantial 
167. Ct. Opinion of Mr. Justice Goldberg, in chambers, on denial of stay pending 
appeal in Rosenblatt v. American Cyanamid Co., 86 S. Ct. 1,3 (1965). 
168. The principal defamation cases are Curtis Publishing Co. v. Golino, 383 F.2d 
586 (5th Cir. 1967), Buckley v. New York Post Corp., 373 F.2d 175 (2d Cir. 1967), 
and New York Times Co. v. Connor, 365 F.2d 567 (5th Cir. 1966). In Curtis Pub-
lishing Co. v. Birdsong, 360 F.2d 344 (5th Cir. 1966), plaintiff, a resident of State X, 
brought suit in State Y, which had no relation to either plaintiff or defendant; this was 
done apparently because State Y's laws were more favorable than State X's. Process 
was quashed since the forum had no relation to or minimum contact with the claim. 
See also Carrington & Martin, Substantive Interests and the Jurisdiction 0/ State Courts, 
66 MICH. L. REv. 227 (1967); Comment, Constitutional Limitations to Long Arm 
Jurisdiction in Newspaper Libel Cases, 34 U. Cm. L. REV. 436 (1967); Comment, 
Long-Arm Jurisdiction Over Publishers: To Chill a Mocking Word, 67 COLUM. L. REv. 
342 (1967). 
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distribution of at least the issue or issues containing the alleged defama-
tion could not be anticipated. By analogy to the products liability 
cases that have emphasized the known or anticipated distribution of the 
product in the forum, all the elements for jurisdiction are present. 
But balancing these established considerations is the concern of 
the courts that excessive or unreasonable extension of jurisdiction in de-
famation cases may seriously interfere with the exercise of rights pro-
tected by the first amendment. Some states have avoided the issue 
by expressly excluding defamation suits from the scope of their long-
arm statutes. lOG But since California does not provide any exclusions 
not required by the Constitution, the question must be faced whether 
there are special jurisdictional limitations on these actions because of 
the guarantees of either the due process clause or the first amendment. 
The principal case denying jurisdiction is the Fifth Circuit holding 
in New York Times Co. v. ConnorYo The action was brought in 
Alabama by a resident of Alabama against the New York Times. The 
alleged defamation was an advertisement in the New York Times pro-
testing the activities of Alabama law enforcemerit officers, including 
Connor, in Alabama during certain civil rights demonstrations. The 
Times had a circulation in Alabama of 395 daily and 2455 on Sunday. 
The circulation was held to be too insubstantial to sustain jurisdiction, 
the court stating that a newspaper could not be sued for circulating a 
libel within a state "where the size of his circulation does not balance 
the danger of his liability."l71 In a subsequent case in the same circuit, 
Curtis Publishing Co. v. Golino,172 jurisdiction was sustained when 
the defendant was a magazine of national circulation. The distinction 
stated in the GoZino opinion was described as follows: "To argue that 
periodic lawsuits resulting from circulation of the Post will chill the 
desire of Curtis to actively encourage the widest possible circulation is 
clearly out of line with economic realities."173 
In Buckley v. New York Post Corp./74 the Second Circuit sustained 
169. "[A] court may exercise personal jurisdiction over any non-domiciliary •.• 
who in person or through an agent: 
"2. commits a tortious act within the state, except as to a cause of action for 
defamation of character arising from the act .... " N.Y. CIV. PRAe. LAw § 302 
(~cKJnney 1966). 
170. 365 F.2d 567 (5th Cir. 1966). 
171. ld. at 572. 
172. 383 F.2d 586 (5th Cir. 1967). 
173. ld. at 592. 
174. 373 F.2d 175 (2d Cir. 1967). 
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jurisdiction in Connecticut, the state of plaintiffs residence, in an action 
against a New York newspaper. The Connor decision was distin-
guished, in part, on grounds that the state court in which the Buck-
ley action had been commenced was in a county that was "economically 
and intellectually one" with New York City, the center of defendant's 
activities and the place of publication.175 But the court also alluded 
to the explosiveness of the issues and the relationship of the parties to 
the local scene in the Connor case as matters which created a serious 
possibility of a prejudicial outcome.176 
There are several separate and distinct threads running through 
these decisions. The first is the nature and scope of the media, the dis-
tinction being clearly made in the Connor and GoUno cases between 
newspapers and magazines.177 A newspaper apparently is regarded as 
a local activity and therefore less subject to suit away from its state of 
publication than a national magazine, which not only seeks but must 
have a national circulation for its existence. But this distinction is 
hard to draw when the newspaper is one that enjoys a national reputa-
tion and seeks a national circulation.178 Furthermore, the rationale for 
the distinction as stated in the GoUno case170 seems wrong. The vital 
consideration is not whether the suit will chill the desire of the publica-
tion to seek the widest possible circulation, but whether the suit will 
chill the desire of the publication to speak out on public issues. 
The second thread, alluded to in the Connor case, is the size of the 
circulation in the forum state. On superficial analysis, consideration of 
this factor may seem to be justified by analogy to those products liability 
cases which have required a regular practice of substantial distribution 
and sale within the forum as a predicate to long-arm jurisdiction over 
the manufacturer. But it is submitted that this analysis is faulty, be-
cause the publisher of an article that is defamatory of a known, identi-
fied person, partic11larly a public figure, can be certain that the offend-
ing issue will have a substantial distribution in the home state of the in-
dividual, even if prior issues had little or no distribution in the area. If 
any analogy is to be drawn with the products liability cases, it should 
be drawn with the supplier who directly supplies a defective article to a 
known and identified purchaser in the forum state.180 And in those 
175. ld. at 184. 
176. ld. at 182, 184. 
177. See Curtis Publishing Co. v. Golino, 383 F.2d 586, 590-91 (5th Cir. 1967). 
178. See Buckley v. New York Post Corp., 373 F.2d 175, 182 (2d Cir. 1967). 
179. 383 F.2d at 590-91. 
180. See, e.g., Cosper v. Smith & Wesson Arms Co., 53 Cal. 2d 77, 346 P.2d 409 
(1959). 
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cases there seems little reason to doubt that jurisdiction will lie in the 
purchaser's state. 
The third thread is the danger of prejudice in the handling or out-
come of the case in the courts of the forum. This, in the Second 
Circuit's view, is the major implication of the Connor decision.l81 If 
this is the thrust of the decisions, another question emerges: Is the 
danger of prejudice, as a limitation on long-arm jurisdiction, peculiar 
to defamation cases or is it available in other tort actions when local in-
fluences may seriously tip the scales of justice in favor of the resident 
plaintiff?182 
In the International Shoe case, the Supreme Court stated that in 
considering the reasonableness of requiring the defendant to defend in 
a particular forum, an " 'estimate of the inconveniences' which would re-
sult to the corporation from a trial away from its 'home' or principal 
place of business is relevant .... "183 Later in the same opinion, 
there is the statement that "[ w ]hether due process is satisfied must 
depend rather upon the quality and nature of the activity in relation to 
the fair and orderly administration of the laws which it was the pur-
pose of the due process clause to insure."184 It is arguable that this 
language is capable of being construed to require a consideration of all 
the factors that might affect the fairness of the outcome, that dangers of 
prejudice are included in the "estimate of the inconveniences" and that 
"fair and orderly administration of the laws" requires an appraisal of 
the dangers of prejudicial treatment. But it is submitted that this is a 
strained and far-fetched interpretation of the language of the decision 
and the meaning of the minimum contacts doctrine.185 It is also sub-
mitted that to inject this issue into all cases of long-arm jurisdiction 
would create hopeless uncertainty that would be far worse than the un-
certainty that resulted from the old concept of "doing business." It 
can only be concluded that the defamation and privacy cases are sui 
181. See 365 F.2d at 572. 
182. In Connor, the Court suggests that defamation, being peculiarly affected 
by the first amendment, requires a greater degree of contact "to satisfy the due process 
clause than is necessary in asserting jurisdiction over other types of tortious activity." 
ld. 
183. 326 U.S. at 317. 
184. ld. at 319. 
185. But compare the approach of the court of appeal in A.R. Indus., Inc. v. 
Superior Court, 268 Cal. App. 2d 328, 73 Cal. Rptr. 920 (1968), where the court 
uses a two-step analysis: First determining that minimum contacts were established in 
California, then proceeding to consider whether on a balance of conveniences, and a 
consideration of "fair play," defendant should be required to defend. ct. Fisher Gov-
ernor Co. v. Superior Court, 53 Cal. 2d 222, 347 P.2d 1, 1 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1959). 
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generis and that if special limitations on jurisdiction are imposed in 
these cases they are exceptions to the minimum contacts doctrine re-
sulting from a greater concern for freedom of expression when national 
figures and national issues are involved. If this is to be the approach, 
then the defamation cases must develop their own special jurisdictional 
rules. To that end, the following suggestions are made. 
If the distinction between the newspaper and the national maga-
zine, or between the local publication and the national publication, is 
a valid one, then like distinctions should exist in the other media of 
public information, notably in radio and television, between the broad-
cast that is limited to the local station and the broadcast that is pro-
duced over a national network. However, it is believed that this dis-
tinction, as well as the distinction on the basis of circulation in the forum, 
is unsound and that the real problem is with the danger of prejudice. 
But it is also submitted that this is not a jurisdictional issue and the pro-
tection against a prejudiced court and jury should be sought in other 
legal doctrines.186 
The Supreme Court, in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,181 has 
mitigated much of the danger by establishing a constitutional standard 
and has thus provided the foundation for Supreme Court review of any 
judgment that appears to apply that standard improperly. But there is 
another, more readily available, source of protection against local 
prejudice. It is almost certain that these cases will fall within the ambit 
of diversity jurisdiction of the federal courts. The amount involved 
ordinarily will be over the jurisdictional minimum and, by hypothesis, 
the plaintiff is a resident of the forum state and the defendant is a 
foreign corporation or an individual citizen and resident of another 
state. If the danger of prejudice from a local trial is serious, the dis-
trict court has the statutory power to transfer the cause to any other 
district where the action might have originally been brought.188 The 
utilization of this section will avoid hardship of dismissal, with attendant 
problems of the statute of limitations, will avoid engrafting peculiar 
exceptions on the jurisdictional rules and will place the solution where 
it properly belongs-in the discretionary power of a court to transfer 
a cause "in the interest of justice." 
186. See Buckley v. New York Post Corp., 373 F.2d 175, 183 (2d Cir. 1967). 
187. 376 U.S. 254 (1964). 
188. 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (1964) provides in part: "For the convenience of 
parties and witnesses, in the interest of justice, a district court may transfer any civil 
action to any other district or division where it might have been brought." 
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IV. Contract Cases 
The preceding pages of this essay have focused primarily on the 
probable application of section 410.10 in tort cases of various sorts; 
products liability cases have claimed by far the greatest share of atten-
tion. Such an imbalanced treatment-as it may seem at first-is be-
lieved to be justified on the ground that products liability is the one 
class of cases where borderline questions as to the extent of California's 
long-arm jurisdiction are most likely to arise, and where an expanded 
jurisdiction over nonresidents is most imperatively necessary if impor-
tant principles of substantive law are to be fully effective. But however 
important the tort cases may be, any forecast of the probable ramifica-
tions of section 410.10 would be incomplete without at least a brief con-
sideration of the ways in which the new statute may extend California's 
long-arm jurisdiction in the other major category of civil litigation-the 
contract cases. 
A. Fundamental Principles 
For purposes of determining which "contractual contacts" justify 
long-arm jurisdiction, the leading post-International Shoe case is McGee 
v. International Life Insurance CO.IS9 The defendant was a Texas life 
insurance company-not qualified to do business in California-which 
reinsured the life of a California resident. The only activities linking 
the insurance company with California were those undertaken pursuant 
to this one insurance policy: The company mailed a certificate of in-
surance to the insured in California; the insured mailed premium pay-
ments from California to the company in Texas. The company main-
tained no office or agents in California, and it is doubtful whether the 
company was doing sufficient business in California so that it could 
be regarded as "present" in California under the fictions which were 
utilized of necessity prior to International Shoe. Ioo The Supreme Court 
in McGee enunciated the fundamental principle that "[i]t is sufficient 
for purposes of due process that the suit was based on a contract which 
had substantial connection with that State,"191 and upheld California's 
189. 355 U.S. 220 (1957). 
190. For an analysis of the old concept of "corporate presence" as a basis of 
jurisdiction over foreign corporations, see Kurland, The Supreme Court, the Due 
Process Clause and the In Personam Jurisdiction of State Courts from Pennoyer to 
Denckla: A Review, 25 U. CHI. L. REV. 569, 580-84 (1958); The Development of 
In Personam Jurisdiction over Individuals and Corporations in California: 1849-1970, 
21 HASTINGS L.J. --, -- (1970). 
191. 355 U.S. at 223. 
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power to exercise its "long-arm" jurisdiction under a 1949 statute192 
subjecting foreign corporations to suit in California based on insurance 
contracts with California residents_ 
Among the contacts with California which the Court found suffi-
cient to support jurisdiction were the following: 
(a) The contract was delivered in California. 
(b) The premiums were mailed from California. 
(c) The insured was a resident of California. 
(d) California has a manifest interest in providing an effective 
means of collection of insurance policies insuring its residents--espe-
cially when claims are so small in amount as to make it scarcely worth-
while for a plaintiff to try to collect by suing in a distant state.193 The 
fact that the California statute went into effect in 1949-after the con-
tract had been executed-was held not to bar its applicability in this 
particular case.194 
McGee is the only Supreme Court case to date in which contacts 
incident to a single contract195 were adjudged sufficient as a basis of 
jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant. It might be argued that 
McGee is not a typical contract case since the subject matter was an in-
surance policy, which a state has an unusually strong interest in regu-
lating. The Supreme Court's language was general, however, and not 
limited to insurance contracts. Moreover, the "manifest state interest" 
was only one of several factors identified as supporting the California 
court's jurisdiction.196 . 
In searching for the outer boundaries of judicial jurisdiction, cases 
denying jurisdiction are more significant than cases granting jurisdic-
diction. Since the International Shoe rule that requires sufficient con-
tacts does not afford any precise measuring stick, a recent Supreme 
192. CAL. INs. CoDE §§ 1610-20. 
193. 355 U.S. at 223. 
194. ld. at 224. 
195. The Court in McGee stated that "so far as the record before us shows, re-
spondent has never solicited or done any insurance business in California apart from 
the policy involved here." ld. at 222. 
196. See text accompanying notes 192-93 supra. See SECOND REsTATEMENT OF 
CONFLICTS § 36, comment e at 190-91: "[Al state may exercise judicial jurisdiction 
over a foreign insurer which negotiates a single insurance contract in the state as to 
causes of action arising from this contract [citing McGeel. It is likewise reasonable 
that a state should exercise judicial jurisdiction over a non-resident individual as to 
causes of action arising from an act done, or caused to be done, by him in the state for 
pecuniary profit and having substantial consequences there even though the act is an 
isolated act not constituting the doing of business in the state." 
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Court case such as McGee can only tell us what combination of con-
tacts is regarded as sufficient, but it cannot tell us what combination of 
contacts is insufficient. The facts in Hanson v. Denckla,197 it will 
be recalled,198 include execution of a trust in Delaware by a Pennsyl-
vania resident, nominating a Delaware bank as the trustee. At a later 
time, the trustor became a Florida resident and exercised, in Florida, 
her power of appointment which had the effect of adding a portion of 
the first trust to two other trusts in which a Delaware resident was 
trustee. An action was brought in Florida concerning the exercise of 
the power of appointment, and the court's ability to reach defend-
ants, including the Delaware trustee, by service outside of Florida 
was in question. The Supreme Court did not regard the later domicile 
of the trustor in Florida and her exercise of the power of appoint-
ment there as being significant in determining whether the Florida court 
could obtain jurisdiction over the Delaware trustee. The Court stated 
that "there must be some act by which the defendant purposefully avails 
itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum state, 
thus invoking the benefits and protections of its laws."199 
Analyzing the facts of Hanson in terms of ordinary contractual 
activity, we find the following elements were absent or present: 
1. Trustor, one of the parties to the trust "contract," was not a 
resident of Florida at the time of execution of the trust. 
2. Trustee, the other party to the trust "contract," (considering 
for purpose of our analysis that a trust instrument which is accepted 
by a trustee is the legal equivalent to an ordinary contract), was never 
a Florida resident, and engaged in no activity there. 
3. The trust contract was partly performed in Florida, but the 
trustee did not know and could not reasonably have contemplated that 
this would occur at the time it accepted the trust. 
4. Trustor later became a Florida resident, but the trustee could 
not reasonably have contemplated this eventuality at the time the trust 
was created. 
Contrast this with McGee, where the insurance company either knew or 
could reasonably have contemplated that upon the death of the insured 
the beneficiaries would be California residents who would logically be 
expected to sue in California on an unpaid claim. 
197. 357 U.S. 235 (1958). 
198. See text accompanying notes 106·07 supra. 
199. 357 U.S. at 253. For a criticism of this decision, see Phillips v. Anchor 
Hocking Glass Corp., 100 Ariz. 251, 256-59, 413 P.2d 732, 735-37 (1966). 
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The fundamental Supreme Court cases yield the following general 
formula for deciding questions of a state's extraterritorial jurisdiction in 
contract actions: The minimum contacts requirement of International 
Shoe is satisfied (1) if the contract in suit has a "substantial connection" 
with the forum state (McGee), and (2) if the substantial connection 
was "purposeful" from the defendant's standpoint-that is, if the de-
fendant could reasonably have foreseen the connection when the con-
tract was made (Hanson). But this general formula is only a starting 
point. In order to resolve practical problems arising under section 
410.10, practitioners need a concrete notion of the specific contractual 
activities which, when purposefully conducted in the forum state, will 
suffice to constitute the requisite connection. For present purposes, 
every ordinary contract may be roughly analyzed as involving three 
differentiable activities: Preliminary negotiation, formation and per-
formance. Thus the essential issue to be resolved in this subsection 
may be stated as follows: In the case of any contract, which of the con-
stitutent contractual activities must take place in California in order to 
satisfy the McGee-Hanson requirement of purposeful and substantial 
connection with the forum, and hence enable a California plaintiff to 
obtain jurisdiction over an out-of-state defendant in an action arising 
out of the contract? Particularly illuminating on this issue are certain 
decisions from other states-states that have long-arm statutes expressly 
conferring personal jurisdiction over nonresident defendants in contract 
actions where the contract in suit is "made" or is "to be performed" with-
in the forum state. 
B. Specific Factors 
(1) Preliminary Negotiations 
When preliminary negotiations are the sole connection between 
the defendant and the forum state, and when the contract is made and 
is to, be performed outside the forum state, there is probably no suffi-
cient basis of jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant in an action 
arising out of the contract. 200 The Maryland court so held in Panameri-
can Consulting Co. v. Corbu Industrial, S.A.,201 a case decided in 
200. "The extent of the defendant's relationship to the state is material. This is so 
because of considerations of fairness to the defendant. For the more closely the de-
fendant is related to the state, the more convenient it will probably be for him to stand 
suit there. . •. [T]he more closely the defendant is related to the state, the greater is 
the interest of the state in him and consequently the more appropriate it will be that 
the state should be in a position to try the case against the defendant in its courts 
•••• " SECOND REsTATEMENT OF CONFLICTS § 36, comment e at 191. 
201. 219 Md. 478, 150 A.2d 250 (1959). 
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1959. Although some preliminary negotiations between the plaintiff, 
a Maryland corporation, and the defendant Mexican corporation had 
taken place in Maryland, the contract had been formally accepted in 
Mexico. The court's decision denying jurisdiction over the defendant 
may have been compelled by the terms of Maryland's long-ann statute, 
which conferred jurisdiction over foreign corporations sued by Mary-
land residents on contracts "made" within the state;202 the court con-
strued this to mean that the statute would not apply unless the acceptance 
had taken place in Maryland. It is not unlikely, however, that such a 
construction was adopted in order to obviate constitutional difficulties 
that might have arisen had the court tried to base jurisdiction on mere 
preliminary negotiations, without anything more in the way of a "sub-
stantial connection." 
(2) Making of a Contract within the State 
A contract is "made," in legal contemplation, in the state where 
the last act necessary to create a binding obligation is performed.203 
This means in essence that a contract is made in whichever state the 
acceptance occurs. Accordingly, the question that presents itself at this 
juncture is whether, under section 410.10, the mere "making" or ac-
ceptance of a contract in California will be sufficient to support juris-
diction over a nonresident defendant in an action arising out of the con-
tract. Several states have enacted long-arm statutes expressly conferring 
jurisdiction in contract actions where the sole "connection" (to use the 
McGee terminology) between the contract in suit and the forum state 
is the making of the contract there.204 Never has the constitutionality 
of such statutes been successfully challenged.205 It should be noted, 
nevertheless, that in most of the cases where long-ann jurisdiction has 
been predicated solely on the making of a contract within the forum, 
the making of the contract was not in fact the defendant's sole con-
tact with the forum.206 For example, in Compania de Astral, S.A. v. 
202. Ch. 504, § 118(d), [1937] Md. Laws (formerly Md. Code Ann. art. 23, 
§ 92(d) (1957». 
203. E.g., Ericksson v. Cartan Travel Bureau, Inc., 109 F. Supp. 315 (D. Md. 
1953 ). 
204. E.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 33-411 (Supp. 1969); N.C. GEN. STAT. 
§ 55-145 (1953). 
205. Cases in which constitutional assaults have been fruitless are collected in By-
ham v. National Cibo House Corp., 265 N.C. 50, 58, 143 S.E.2d 225, 232 (1965). 
206. E.g., Kokomo Opalescent Glass Co. v. Arthur W. Schmid Int'l, Inc., 371 
F.2d 208 (7th Cir. 1966); National Gas Appliance Corp. v. AB Electrolux, 270 F.2d 
472 (7th Cir.), cert. de1lied, 361 U.S. 959 (1959); Michael Schiavone & Sons v. Gal-
land-Henning Mfg. Co., 263 F. Supp. 261 (D. Conn. 1967); Electronic Mfg. Corp. v. 
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Boston Metals CO.,207 another Maryland case, it was determined that the 
contract in suit had been "made" or accepted in Maryland, and that 
jurisdiction over the Panamanian defendant could properly be obtained. 
But the court carefully emphasized partial performance of the con-
tract was also to take place in Maryland208-and this despite the fact 
that the applicable Maryland long-arm statute says nothing about per-
formance. 
In view of the absence of any case in which long-arm jurisdiction 
was predicated solely on acceptance of a contract within the state, a con-
servative forecast as to the operation of section 410.10 in such a situa-
tion should run something like this: If the sole connection between the 
contract in suit and the state of California is the fact' that it was accepted 
there, then jurisdiction over the nonresident defendant may well prove 
unobtainable;209 but if in addition to the acceptance in California, some 
part-however slight-of either party's performance was to be under-
taken there, then the exercise of jurisdiction will probably be upheld.210 
(3) Performance within the State 
The cases leave little room for doubt that when the contract in suit 
is to be performed wholly or in part by either party within the forum 
state, the requisite substantial connection exists and long-arm jurisdic-
tion over an absent defendant may properly be assumed.211 The only 
apparent qualification to this broad statement is the one imposed by 
Hanson: The defendant must have been able to foresee, at the time 
the contract was executed, that performance would take place within 
the state. 
The leading case in the contracts field lends some support to this 
proposition. In McGee, both the plaintiffs performance-mailing 
Trion, Inc., 205 F. Supp. 842 (S.D. Ind. 1962); Kropp Forge Co. v. Jawitz, 37 TIl. 
App. 2d 475, 186 N.E.2d 76 (1962); Esser v. Cantor, 55 Misc. 2d 235, 284 N.Y.S.2d 
914 (New York City Civ. Ct.), alfd, 55 Misc. 2d 720, 286 N.Y.S.2d 389 (Sup. Ct. App. 
T. 1967). 
207. 205 Md. 237, 107 A.2d 357 (1954), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 943 (1955). 
208. ld. at 261, 107 A.2d at 367-68. 
209. See SECOND RESTATEMENT OF CONFUCTS § 36, comment e at 193: "Wbile in 
state X where both are domiciled, A and B negotiate the terms of a contract which 
is to be performed in X. The contract is drawn up in X and B signs it there. A, how-
ever, is too hurried to sign the contract at that time. He signs it in State Y and from 
there mails it back to B in X. On these facts alone, Y may not exercise judicial 
jurisdiction over A as to causes of action arising from the contract." 
210. See SECOND RESTATEMENT OF CoNFLICTS § 36, comment e at 193, TIlustra-
tion 3. 
211. See cases cited note 206 supra. 
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premium payments-and the defendant's performance-paying the 
beneficiary upon the death of the policyholder-were to take place in 
California. There were, of course, additional connections with Cali-
fornia: Some preliminary negotiations occurred here, the contract was 
accepted here, and-as the Court emphasized-California had a special 
interest in facilitating suits by residents against out-of-state insurers. 
The fact that both parties' performance was to be undertaken in Cali-
fornia doubtless carried great weight, however, and may well have 
sufficed in itself to support California's exercise of long-arm jurisdic-
tion. California's "manifest interest" would have been much less sub-
stantial if the contract were to have been performed elsewhere.212 
The notion that mere performance of a contract in the forum state 
constitutes the requisite substantial connection is considerably reinforced 
by a recent North Carolina case, Byham v. National Cibo House 
Corp.213 This was a suit brought against a Tennessee franchisor by a 
North Carolina franchisee who sought to rescind the franchise agree-
ment and recover damages for the franchisor's alleged fraud. The 
applicable North Carolina long-arm statute subjected foreign corpora-
tions to the state's jurisdiction in any action arising out of a contract 
made or to be performed in North Carolina.214 The contract involved 
in Byham had not been "made" in North Carolina; technically, it was 
accepted by the defendant in Tennessee. Nevertheless, jurisdiction of 
the North Carolina court was upheld on the ground that the contract 
was to be performed in that state. 
The foregoing analysis of contractual contacts may appear overly 
mechanical and academic. Most of the reported decisions bear witness 
that as a practical matter, a contracts case will seldom arise where 
either preliminary negotiations, acceptance, or performance is the only 
substantial and purposeful connection with the forum state.215 In the 
overwhelming majority of cases, more than one-and very likely all 
three-of these factors will be present. In many cases, there will be 
some basis other than the isolated contractual contact, such as status, 
"presence," etc., upon which long-arm jurisdiction can be based. In 
all of these situations, if they occur in California, jurisdiction over an 
absent defendant will almost certainly be obtainable under new sec-
tion 410.10. 
212. See note 200 supra. 
213. 265 N.C. 50, 143 S.E.2d 225 (1965). 
214. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-145 (1953). 
215. See, e.g., Panamerican Consulting Co. v. Corbu Industrial, S.A., 219 Md. 478, 
150 A.2d 250 (1959); Compania de Astral, S.A. v. Boston Metals Co., 205 Md. 237, 
107 A.2d 357, cert. denied, 348 U.S. 943 (1955). 
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Conclusion 
As stated at the outset, the overriding purpose of this essay has 
been to seek practical guidelines for the interpretation of California's 
new long-arm statute and to predict its probable application in various 
types of concrete cases. Such an enterprise is surely a necessary one; 
but in a certain sense, it can never be completed and will always fall 
short of perfection-if perfection be defined as a minutely detailed 
and permanently valid classification of all factual situations in which 
a state's exercise of jurisdiction over an absent defendant may be sus-
tained. The mandate of section 410.10 is in terms coextensive with 
the mandate of constitutional due process, and due process issues are 
not susceptible of any such precise and definitive resolution. New de-
velopments in society at large will cause jurisdictional issues to be pre-
sented in the context of new and unforeseen factual situations. These 
in turn will call for innovative interpretations of the due process limits. 
As Mr. Justice Black observed in McGee: 
Looking back over this long history of litigation [from Pen-
noyer through International Shoe] a trend is clearly discernible 
toward expanding the permissible scope of state jurisdiction over 
foreign corporations and other nonresidents. In part this is at-
tributable to the fundamental transformation of our national econ-
omy over the years. . .. With [the] increasing nationalization of 
commerce has come a great increase in the amount of business 
conducted by mail across state lines. At the same time modem 
transportation and communication have made it much less burden-
some for a party sued to defend himself in a State where he engages 
in economic activity.216 
California courts, in their past decisions, have recognized that the 
"fundamental transformation" here referred to is a continuing process, 
and that the concomitant expansion of the permissible scope of state 
jurisdiction should continue at an equal pace. They have therefore 
demonstrated a willingness to place a broad and liberal construction 
upon the various long-arm provisions in effect prior to the enactment of 
section 410.10. The leading example is Henry R. Jahn & Son v. Su-
perior Court,217 in which the supreme court interpreted the "doing 
business" provisions of old section 411 to require only that a foreign 
corporate defendant have minimum contacts with the state. The courts, 
henceforth unhindered by statutory restrictions, will doubtless continue 
this process of liberal construction when they begin to apply section 
410.10. 
216. 355 U.S. at 222-23. 
7.17. 49 Cal. 2d 855, 323 P.2d 438 (1958). 
